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Downsizing the
Massachusetts
Mental Health
System

The

Politics

of Evasion

Richard A. Hogarty

For

the past three decades the topic of the proper role of state mental hospitals has been

vigorously debated as a major public policy issue in Massachusetts. The state has

had

two runs at hospital closings: the first between 1973 and 1981, when the deinstitutionalsecond between 1991 and 1993, when the privatization
making the case for this seismic shift, a governors special
commission concluded that the state had too many hospitals for too few patients at
ization policy flourished, the

policy

was developed.

In

too high a cost. This study provides a detailed analysis of the problems that beset the
Department of Mental Health when it sought to implement the hospital reduction
strategy

and

restructure

its

service delivery system.

focuses on the closing phenomenon

in general,

and

From a practical perspective,

it

the closure of Metropolitan State

Hospital in particular. Overall, the specific problems presented a formidable challenge
that

placed what appeared

to

patients, families, providers,

be inordinate demands on the stakeholders involved

and advocates. The major emphasis

is

on mental health

many participants who influence policy and programs. These
ences offer much to be understood by and transmitted to policymakers.

politics

and

—

the

experi-

The Contending Forces
Public service bureaucracies like the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health

(DMH)

are notoriously

cumbersome and

inefficient.

They

often have to contend with

powerful and well-organized public service employee unions, which drive up costs

and complicate policy innovation and organizational change. Perhaps there
illustration

is

no better

of this phenomenon than the downsizing of the mental health care system.

Between 1991 and 1993, the state closed three adult mental hospitals and a children's
psychiatric center. Over the years the quality of treatment at these four institutions had
steadily deteriorated. To be sure, the deliverers of mental health services had become
unduly burdened by political and contractual obligations to organized groups. Mental
health advocates and labor unions denounced these plans as schemes to destroy the
social safety net of patients. Although the results of these changes were not altogether
beneficial, they at least provided an alternative approach to the traditional
things. This innovation, if

still

way

of doing

extremely controversial, broke the stranglehold of power

that the contending forces maintained over the system.

Richard A. Hogarty, a senior fellow at the John W. McCormack

Institute

of Public Affairs and professor of
and local government.

political science, University of Massachusetts Boston, specializes in the politics of state
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Mental illnesses are among the most devastating conditions

in society.

disorders, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, otherwise

known

Severe mental

as manic-

depressive disorder, are incurable, incapacitating, and extremely difficult to

They

treat.

cause incalculable suffering for patients and wreak havoc on their families. Those
flicted lose

After

touch with

all,

reality.

As Clea Simon

puts

af-

it,

mental illnesses by their nature involve a person's

ability to think clearly

The mood, or affective disorders, such as bipolar, may produce extreme
emotional states. The thought disorders, such as schizophrenia and other psychoses,
and

rationally.

may produce

hallucinations and delusions.

1

During a psychiatric breakdown or full-blown psychosis, a person's whole world

Sometimes it ends tragically, in suicide.
Few social problems are more perplexing and

falls

apart.

often unpredictable course of mental

themselves to simple solutions.
torn asunder.
their

and

own

They wind up

illness, the

Many

treated, there is presently

Given the

erratic

accompany

that

it

and

do not lend

troubled families find their lives disrupted and

in dire straits; older parents particularly feel the effects of

aging and wanting to see a mentally

living independently.

intractable.

problems

It is

no

ill

son or daughter restored to stability

essential to recognize that while mental illness can be

cure.

During the acute phase of illness, most patients

require short-term intensive services in secure settings, usually locked hospital wards.

This in-volves either voluntary or involuntary commitment.
In Massachusetts, with a population of nearly 6 million people, an estimated 44,730
adults are diagnosed with serious mental illness.
for fiscal year 1996, the

DMH service system

is

With an annual budget of S520 million
designed to accommodate 80,000 con-

sumers. This beleaguered department has been a recurring managerial nightmare for

Republican and Democratic administrations

alike. Indeed, the

agency has always been

regarded as complicated to manage. Buffeted by changing social demographics and
the competition for scarce resources, the state's mental health system has been vul-

nerable to underfunding and inadequate staffing for as long as anyone can remember.

Forty years ago there were more than 23,000 patients in the custody of state-operated

mental hospitals scattered around the commonwealth. Today, as a result of restructuring policies that were implemented during the early 1990s, the
1

,280 beds of

and other
tract

with

More

its

own, plus another

facilities

1

Bay

State has about

,250 beds in smaller units in independent hospitals

operated by publicly funded private- sector management under con-

DMH.

than 165 years ago, Massachusetts led the nation in building a network of

public asylums

whose spacious outdoor campuses provided

ronment for the mentally

ill.

fresh air and a serene envi-

In their prime, these large congregate hospitals functioned

They responded to the needs of the insane, the aged infirm,
and the dispossessed who could not afford proper medical care.

best as an extended system.
the poor and disabled,

With the passage of time, these facilities have become increasingly obsolete, outdated
relics of a bygone era. Contributing to their obsolescence were the dramatic changes
in psychiatry and community mental health programs that have taken place over the past
forty years.

On
that

closer inspection, mental health can be classified as a latent issue.

no one wants

to talk about,

it is

A taboo

topic

the opposite of a hot-button issue. Mental hospitals

are out of sight, and therefore out of the public's mind.

11

From

time to time hot-button

events do occur, but for the most part the problem receives

which nobody wants

to deal.

Too

often

falls

it

There are essentially four contending forces

at

play here. First, mental health

social

problem whose complexities are routinely pushed

about

how

to cure such illnesses, there

aside.

may be no immediate

the adverse side effects of mind-altering drugs accompanies

not fully understood.

tial

and

benefits

Nor

risks. In

men-

it,

this

new technology

this

Some who

technology, doctors have been naive about releasare

deemed well enough

to live in the

communi-

have proved to be a danger to themselves and others. This social disruption, plus the

lack of tolerance for deviance in the larger society, explains

programs

to develop. Third, the

that wield considerable

development. The

rise

in the early 1970s,
activists,

power so

that legislators

of such activists as

Ben

have made their presence

who have engaged

why

it

takes so long for

new

bureaucracy and labor unions are entrenched forces

and governors have been reluctant

take them on. Fourth, mental health advocates have

of

resolution. Second,

are the "miracle drugs" user-friendly, for they have poten-

handling

ing patients from hospitals.
ty

a

is

Without more knowledge

health care involves a changing technology that seeks to stabilize people, but because

tal

is

public attention, with

little

prey to the politics of evasion.

made

Ricci,

felt in

who

to

a significant impact on policy
first

challenged the system

Massachusetts. The primary mission

in the politics of public

advocacy

in order to

combat

the politics of evasion, has been to protect the rights of patients and to hold service

providers

more accountable. Because

the varied rights are sometimes in conflict with

one another, the interplay of these forces explains

why change comes

so hard.

None

of them operates in isolation, and they are contradictory and contentious. Understanding
the

ways

closings

The

in which they complement and counteract one another makes
more comprehensible.

the hospital

Shift to Privatization

Hardly anything could have prepared the residents of Massachusetts,

who had just

expe-

rienced the prosperity of the so-called Massachusetts Miracle, for the economic and
fiscal disasters that

would

befall

them

in the years

between 1988 and 1992. As a pros-

perous economy faltered and then collapsed, the business community began to downsize

and lay off employees. The high-tech and defense industries were especially hard

By

summer of 1990

the

the

Bay

State, like the rest

hit.

of the nation, was in the midst of a

full-blown recession turning into a depression. Banks failed, the savings and loan industry collapsed,

investments turned sour, depositors lost their savings,

retail sales

slumped,

housing construction declined, major industries went out of business, and unemploy-

ment rose

to

new

heights. Chelsea's city

government declared bankruptcy and was

placed in receivership. Cries for downsizing were heard in both the public and private
sectors.

The

people were hurting were evident as early as 1986. State and
had doubled since 1980, and expenditures almost doubled in those six years.
These events caused a serious decline in public revenues, which in turn led state offitelltale signs that

local debt

cials to increase taxes

and cut services. This intolerable situation produced enormous
The time of genuine reckoning was at hand. Faced with a fiscal

pressures to economize.
crisis,

the executive and legislative branches of state

government were compelled

to

cut back on social services and welfare funding.

As

the state's fiscal crisis deepened, the Democratic leaders on

downsizing

state

government. Such a course of action was

12
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of their party. Since the days of the

New

Deal, most of them had favored an active,

when

involved role for government, particularly

income

budget. Beneath the majestic golden

it

to

meeting the needs of low

dome of the

The

battle over these

budget cuts was

bitter

and acrimonious. 2

Michael Dukakis lame duck administration began making

cuts, but they

were not

revenue

sufficient to cover the

shortfalls.

requires a governor to submit a balanced budget, but despite
dollar tax increases, Massachusetts
state

which Charles Bulfinch

the pressure of fiscal deficits, antitax pressures, and the rising costs of

services, the

The

threats to slash the state

State House,

in 1798, they cut

assisted housing.

Under

came

$36 million from DMH's budget for fiscal year 1991,
from $497 million to $461 million. They also reduced the authorization for

had designed
reducing

it

Democrats made good on

families. Nevertheless, the

was on

credit

watch and

had a $1.8

its

bond

billion deficit

The

drastic

human

budget

state constitution

two consecutive

when Dukakis

billion-

left office.

rating had sunk to almost that of a junk

bond. All these events generated intense public anger, for

many taxpayers

believed that

blame for the state's fiscal problems. Public fury
reached a boiling point during the 1990 elections.
In the primary election, which was only a warm-up for the main event, the two
the politicians themselves were to

major parties selected gubernatorial candidates

who

ran as self-styled political outsiders.

In the general election, Republican William Weld, a politician of patrician pedigree,

was

pitted against

Boston University.
the

Democrat John
It

Silber, the

outspoken and controversial president of

turned out to be a hotly contested and bitterly fought race in which

outcome remained very much

in doubt until the end.

The enraged voters had become

increasingly distrustful and cynical of government.

A graduate of Harvard Law

School and a former U.S. attorney in the Ronald Reagan

Weld was pro-choice and pro-gay

rights, but he was a hardliner when
came to crime, spending, and taxes. In addition to his base of mainstream Republicans, Weld appealed primarily to women, gays, minorities, and disaffected Democrats.
As the campaign wore on, he railed against big government and extolled the virtues

administration,
it

of free enterprise and the workings of the marketplace. His disdain toward bureaucracy

was

vitriolic.

comment

At one

point, he derisively referred to state

employees as walruses, a

him to this constituency. Privatization, reinventing government, and total quality management were the popular buzzwords of the day. Ideologically a freewheeling libertarian, Weld promised the voters no new taxes. This popularly

that did not endear

understandable rhetoric quickly translated into a politically viable philosophy that

was shrewdly attuned to the temper of the times. In the closing days of the campaign,
Silber seemed to stumble. Strident and contentious as ever, he bungled a television
interview with Natalie Jacobson, which cost him dearly. In the end, Weld narrowly defeated Silber, the women's vote carrying him to victory.
Pressures on the newly elected governor
the head of the first Republican administration in more than sixteen years
to overcome past tradition and cut through the
complexities to a prompt solution of the budget deficit were strong. Given the prevailing

—

—

skepticism about the fiscal capacity of state government, the impulse to "privatize"

was almost

irresistible.

Vigorous gubernatorial action would be possible under these

circumstances. Fresh from the campaign,

Weld called on state administrators to privatize
would save money or improve services.

functions wherever they believed such action

He moved

aggressively to gain control of a recalcitrant bureaucracy and to reduce

the large deficit he had inherited. Dukakis holdovers,

who were

plentiful, departed only

with the greatest reluctance, compounding the atmosphere of distrust and deceit. Per-

13

suaded as to the policy

economics as a
to

utility

of privatization,

Weld

eagerly embraced public-choice

substitute for institutional development. His

government. As a deliberate

strategy,

Weld sought

was a minimalist approach

to reduce the size of state

gov-

erment, comprising 72,000 employees. These were trends thoroughly consistent with the

governor's temperament and philosophy.

For more than a decade the
alarming

Because of

rate.

state's

human

services budget had been growing at an

its legislators' liberal

commitment toward

money on human services
very time when the demand for

the poor and needy,

Massachusetts spent more

than any state except

Unfortunately,

these services

ing, the

at the

commonwealth was

losing the

economic capacity

to finance

portionate share of the mental health budget went toward financing

antiquated hospitals.
state hospital

By 1991

its

it

more

them.

its

A dispro-

outmoded and

strongly, 6 percent of

DMH consumers were

resources. Although more than 750 inpatients were ready to be

discharged, they could not be placed in the

community

of January 1991, the adult inpatient census at

all

who had

As

2,021.

secretary of the executive office of Health and

appointed David Forsberg,

for lack of assisted housing.

DMH facilities — seven state hospitals

— was

and eight community mental health centers

As

New York.

steadily increas-

the annual average cost of caring for a mental patient in a

was $120,000. To put

using 47 percent of

was

Human

Services,

Governor Weld

formerly headed the regional office of the U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development. Even before Weld was inaugurated,
the immediate focus of his principal

economic advisers was

to bring the fiscal crisis

under control. They proposed doing so by imposing effective cost containment measures
that

would harness

the so-called budget busters, identified as Medicaid, debt service,

pensions, group health insurance, and the Metropolitan
It

was these

big-ticket items that caught the public eye.

Bay

Transportation Authority.

There were no magic

elixirs

Weld chose to tackle. Alarms were sounded from
various quarters in the spring of 1990. The gap between public revenues and expenditures had been documented in a report published by the McCormack Institute, which

to resolve the perplexing issues that

analyzed the

state's fiscal crisis

Responding

and sent warning signals of trouble ahead.

to this crisis, the

3

Republican governor placed a cap on spiraling debt

service costs that limited capital spending over the next five years to $4.5 billion.

refused to borrow

spread

it

money

to cover the deficit.

He

Weld

refinanced the outstanding debt and

out over a longer period of time and threatened to veto any tax increases.

adopting such a strategy, the governor had put the legislature in a box.

It

By

was a well

executed political squeeze play.

Over and beyond this, the Weld administration discovered how to milk the federal
cow by way of reimbursements. In 1991 Kathy Berts, an obscure state employee,
spotted a loophole in the Medicaid regulations. The provision was originally designed to

cash

reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of poor people, but almost every
state

discovered

its

dual use as a

means of financing other

projects.

$500-million windfall for Massachusetts, an instant remedy for
cial clinical rationale for closing the

community

settings.

But the

The

result

its fiscal crisis.

was a
The offi-

mental hospitals was that patients do better in

fiscal rationale

was even more compelling. Although Medi-

caid did not cover mental patients in state institutions,

it

paid half the costs for patients

community care. The yield was $21 million a year in federal funds.
The overall strategy called for the purchase of service contracts. Packaged under
the policy tag "public managed care," the DMH program consisted of five components:
(1) closing state hospitals through privatization; (2) moving more resources into the
in
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community;

developing a comprehensive community support system model;

(4) creating

(3)

an infrastructure for quality and utilization management and; (5) integrating

the dual systems of care that existed between the Department of Mental Health and the

Division of Medical Assistance (Medicaid). These sweeping policy changes, which were

introduced by the newly appointed commissioner, Eileen Elias, shifted

den for mental health care from the

state to private

reveal that the length of public hospital stays

was

much

of the bur-

management. Hindsight was

to

num-

substantially shortened, and the

ber of institutionalized patients was sharply reduced, from 2,330 to 1,160. Contracting

with private agencies to provide services formerly supplied by state government was not
exactly a

new

had been increasingly provided by

idea. Since the 1960s, services

not-for-profit agencies

private,

under government supervision. What was new, of course, was

shifting the locus of service delivery to private enterprise.

Central to the policies then being fashioned were two recent changes in state law that
signaled a

move toward

The

privatization.

first,

a statute passed in 1987 (Chapter 167),

authorized the creation of psychiatric units in private or general hospitals.
legislation

care program for recipients.

The second,

implement a managed
The economic theory behind managed care was to move

passed in 1990 (Chapter 150), authorized Medicaid

to

people out of high-cost institutional settings. Chapter 167 allowed the state to share the
cost of mental health care with third-party payers

by

transferring

of ineligible hospitals and into reimbursable acute-care

law was due to expire
Subsequently,

new

in

October 1991 and

its

facilities.

Medicaid patients out

The

hospital financing

renewal was regarded as problematic.

hospital financing legislation reduced regulatory requirements

and

created opportunities for selective contracting with health care providers. This legisla-

was

tion

particularly helpful in

removing

barriers to caring for patients with long-term

serious mental illness in private or general hospitals.

His

alert

sense of these trends shaped the strategy of Governor Weld,

himself as a social liberal and a fiscal conservative.

On

who

described

February 26, 1991, as the

pressures of office descended on him, he appointed a seventeen-member special

com-

mission to study the problem of state-operated hospitals. This blue-ribbon commission

was comprised of four
union

official,

state legislators,

two Democrats and two Republicans, a labor

a family member, six experts on health care and housing policy, three

agency commissioners, and two cabinet secretaries.
of

its

ties

members were favorably disposed toward

from large

state institutions to private

It

was stacked

in the sense that

most

shifting care for persons with disabili-

community-based organizations,

hospitals,

and nursing homes. Their work began immediately under the direction of David Forsberg,

who

served as chair.

He was

assisted

by

his able deputy, Charles Baker,

chaired a working subgroup of state employees.
tration,

As

Forsberg and Baker worked well together.

Forsberg possessed well-honed political

skills,

the Pioneer Institute, a conservative think tank,

the point

men

A politically

for the

who

Weld adminis-

savvy administrator,

who had come

over from
was a good number cruncher and a

while Baker,

superb technician.

With a specific focus and genuine political clout among its members, the commismoved at a rapid pace. In whirlwind fashion, they took their show on the road and

sion

inspected most state health
visits

facilities.

This tour de force consisted of thirty-one

and fifteen hours of public hearings that were held in various parts of the

site

state.

The commission spent numerous hours deliberating and studying background materials.
Based on their work, they found among other things that the state had a shrinking
patient population

and an excess capacity of hospital beds.
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The

nature and extent of this problem were clearly outlined in their report.

The Commonwealth's

inpatient facilities system,

over 35,000 individuals

at its

which was

built to

accommodate
some

peak, today cares for 6,200 clients. Encompassing

10,500 acres and over 1,000 buildings, stretched over 34 campuses, the inpatient

system

is

grossly oversized for the

number of people

6,200 individuals receiving care in institutions,
ately cared for in

which do

community-based

in its care.

at least

Today, the

settings.

state's inpatient facilities,

an important need for very specific kinds of

fill

ately sized with capacity to care for 4,000 clients.

Moreover, of those

2,200 would be more appropri-

clients,

would be appropri-

4

A spirit of open inquiry prevailed among the commission members. Much of their
were able to do
The major problem was how to maximize federal reimbursements for mental
hospitals. Only those patients twenty-one years of age and under and sixty-five years of
deliberation focused on the impact of federal aid and what the states

with

it.

age and over were eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Conversely, those between the
ages of twenty-two and sixty-four were ineligible. Commission
trend that national mental health care

was moving toward a

members recognized

the

noninstitutional approach.

After crisis intervention and acute care had been rendered, the integration of community
services

was viewed

as a better solution than restricted institutional care. In shifting to

such an approach, the trick was to separate housing needs from treatment needs. Clients
could not obtain Medicaid

money

for housing except through waivers.

who

Drawing on

chairman David Forsburg and Eleanor White,

their experience in the housing field, both

served as deputy director of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, played

members of considerations that they
real estate market made it easy
Charles Baker knew how to access

a critical role in reminding their fellow commission

might otherwise have ignored. The recent crash in the
for clients to obtain assisted housing.

For

housing that was not treatment oriented.

his part,

New

federal and state laws

made

it

illegal to

dicriminate against the mentally disabled. 5

Four months
its

later,

on June

19, 1991, the governor's special

commission released

report 'Actions for Quality Care." Charged to develop a specific plan,

that a

systemwide solution was warranted. Devising what

hospital reduction strategy, the

it

concluded

commission recommended closing nine of thirty-four

inpatient facilities over a three-year period with patients being

community or

it

termed a "right-sizing"

to public or private hospitals.

Among those

moved either to the
recommended for

facilities

closing were three adult mental hospitals, three public health hospitals, and three

schools for the mentally retarded. Describing community-based services as "highly
desirable, highly effective,

also called for the

and

less

expensive than institutional care," the commission

development of 2,000 new community residential placements and

community support programs (700 of these specifically targeted for persons
illness). In addition, it recommended that 300 new general hospital acutecare beds and 200 new long-term-care nursing home beds be created for former state

associated

with mental

hospital patients.

As a sign that it was operating in good faith, the commission explicitly acknowledged the failures of past efforts to deinstitutionalize clients and therefore promised
no patient would be moved from a state facility slated for closure until an "equal or
6

that

The commission estimated that its recommendations would save the state approximately $60 million in annual operating costs
and another $144 million in capital avoidance, which would not have to be spent to

better" alternative care setting

was

available.
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Commission on Accreditation

bring antiquated facilities up to the standards of the Joint

of Healthcare Organizations and the Health Care Finance Administration.

This was not a policy brought forward by overwhelming popular demand. Activists

and mental health professionals had talked about
swell existed in

its

behalf. In the fall of

it

for years, but no political ground-

1990 the Massachusetts Association for Mental

Health had published a working paper suggesting that three state hospitals
Metropolitan State, and Northampton
to

Bernard Carey, the executive

to the

— were prime candidates
intent of the

director, the

winner of the gubernatorial

7

election. Interestingly

three hospitals that the governor's special

first

had

to accept the

this

paper

enough, these were the same

commission put on the closing block.
its

hospitals,

Governor

commission's recommendations. Barriers to policy im-

plementation, such as collective bargaining agreements, stood in the
action. Closing

According

group was to give

Before the Department of Mental Health could close any of

Weld

— Danvers,

for closure.

underused hospitals would prove to be very

way of executive

difficult politically.

Previous administrations had been either unwilling or unable to take on the legislature

and the powerful

state

employee unions. Stimulated by the work of the governor's com-

mission and given the green light by Weld,

DMH quickly moved to close three of

seven remaining adult hospitals and Gaebler,

remained on go.

Much

its

one children's

like the military base closings

change pro-cess not without pain and considerable

From

its

hospital. All signals

on the national

level,

it

was a

conflict.

a political standpoint, the governor's special commission had the practical

effect of shifting the locus of decision

for Weld.

A bipartisan

making. As such,

consensus existed among the four

it

provided a convenient buffer

state legislators

who

served

on the commission. Democrats Edward Burke and Barbara Gray and Republicans
Arthur Chase and Edward Teague voted in favor of the plan. The only negative vote

was cast by Laura Spenser of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees Council 93, who represented organized labor. Taking a strong stand against
privatization and the laying off of state employees, she filed a minority report.
Among those hospitals placed on the hit list of recommended closings was Metropolitan State, where a planned phasedown from 400 to 120 patients was already well under
way. The two other adult mental hospitals scheduled to be closed were Danvers and
Northampton. Selection of these three institutions was based mainly on the grounds of
their inefficiency, costliness, and underutilization. Beyond these criteria, all three were
situated in areas where there was a large provider base and private hospitals could
handle acute care. Finally, their closure was deemed politically feasible. 8
The downsizing of Metropolitan State predated Weld's appointment of Eileen Elias
as mental health commissioner in June of 1991. The governor was eager to appoint
women to high-level positions. Elias replaced Henry Tomes, a holdover Dukakis appointee, who had resigned a month earlier. Before coming to Massachusetts, Elias had
worked for twenty-five years as a psychiatric rehabilitation counselor in both the private
and public sectors. She had recently served as area director on Cape Cod and the offshore islands. Not only was she the first woman commissioner in a state renowned
for its entrenched old-boy political network, but she was even more of an outsider in
that she originated from Philadelphia and New Jersey. Furthermore, she had no formal
connections to the prestigious Boston area academic institutions that exercised considerable influence in the state's mental health arena. 9

mandated by the Weld administration and
worked with people from across the state, developing and

In response to the agenda for change

her

own reform

vision, Elias
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Time Line and Events
1990

November
November

5

Adolescent unit transferred to Somerville Hospital.
Central Middlesex admissions diverted to Westborough

December

17

State Hospital.
R1 closed.

1991

February 4-12

admissions diverted to Danvers State Hospital and pritwo patients transferred to Worcester State Hospital;
Cambridge/Somerville (C/S) admission remained; cost funded
through June 1991.
Fourteen patients transferred to Westborough State Hospital.
One patient transferred to Lindemann Mental Health Center.
One patient transferred to Worcester State Hospital; Commissioner
Tomes meets with interested families at Kline Hall.
Four patients transferred to Worcester State Hospital; twenty-four

February
February
February
February

patients transferred to Westborough State Hospital.
R4 closed.
B1 closed.
One patient transferred to Farren Care Center.
Shuttle service to Worcester and Westborough State hospitals

January 2

Tri-City (TC)

vate

January 2-10
January 16
January 29

5
11

15
16

facilities;

commenced.
February 20
February 27

March 13
March 20
April 2
April
April

4-9
1-15

Two
Two

patients transferred to Westborough State Hospital.
patients transferred to Worcester State Hospital.
Three patients transferred to Westborough.
Two patients transferred to Westborough.
Five patients transferred to Westborough.
Four patients transferred to Worcester.
Pierson Road (C/S) residence opened for eight patients; Saugus
House residence opened for eight patients; Woburn House residence
opened for eight patients; Banks Street, Waltham, residence opened
for eight patients.

Three patients transferred to Westborough.

April 17
April

23-29

Hammond

Street residence (C/S) opened for eight patients; onfor six patients; Watertown apartment

grounds Residence opened
opened for four patients.
I

May 2
May 9
May 21
May 30

Semrad Unit shut with closing of D1 and
Maynard House opened for ten patients.
One patient transferred to Worcester.

A2.

Watertown apartment opened

for four patients; one patient transferred to Worcester.
June 6
One patient transferred to Westborough.
June 20
Commissioner Elias announced the closing of Metropolitan State
Hospital to families and staff.
July 3
Danvers cottage opened for four patients.
September 3
Admissions service moved to R1.
September 24
Cambridge Hospital temporarily relocated Cahill 4 to R2.
November 6
Magazine Street opened for ten C/S patients.
November 13-20 Five patients transferred to Danvers.
November 15
McLaughlin House opened for six central Middlesex patients.
November 20
Marguerite Terrace opened for twelve central Middlesex patients.
November 21-25 Three T/C patients discharged to existing community residences.
December 3-5
Ten patients transferred to Westborough.
December 5-10
Five patients transferred to Danvers; C/S opened apartments for

twenty-four patients.

December
December
December
December

10

16-30
10-30
28

Four patients transferred to Westborough.
Burke Unit shut with closing of ME2.
Seventeen patients transferred to Medfield State Hospital.
C/S Unit shut with closing of M&S2.

1992

January 31

Metropolitan State Hospital

officially closed.
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change and challenging them to work with her to develop a
Her concept was based on principles of consumer

articulating the vision of

blueprint for improving the system.

empowerment, community-based organized systems of

care, flexible use of resources,

protection of the local service system and accountability. But these principles carried

consequences

that, unless anticipated

and managed, ensured policy

disasters. Feisty

and

determined, Elias fought hard to achieve her goals.
Dr. Annette Hanson, a psychiatrist

who came from

the private sector,

deputy commissioner for clinical and professional services.

command

By

was named

law, the department's

if the commissioner
by general counsel Jennifer Wilcox and two other deputy
Valerie Fletcher in charge of program operations and John Ford in
commissioners
charge of budget and finance. This team was responsible for implementing the recom-

second

is not.

in

They were

—

is

required to be a board-certified psychiatrist

assisted

mendations of the governor's special commission.

These hospital closings, so painfully generated, aroused intense opposition. Hostility

was concentrated in those areas where the targeted hospitals were located.
The battle to keep them open was fought by those most directly threatened and most
capable of effective defense and counterattack. They included adversely affected special
interest groups such as the Massachusetts Alliance for the Mentally 111 and the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. Encompassing thirty-four local
to the plan

chapters across the state, the alliance

is

a grassroots family advocacy organization

whose main purpose is to lobby on behalf of relatively powerless people. In addition,
Governor Weld received a petition signed by more than 5,000 citizens urging him
not to close the

facilities.

Undeterred by
initiatives.

10

this opposition,

Emboldened by

Weld remained

in a substantial reduction of public spending, the

ference, he declared,
their
so,

"While the top

recommendations

will result in

how

open

to free

up

until they

By

priority of the special

tremendous savings

money from

that

it

would

result

commission

to the

is

client care,

Commonwealth." Even
11

a reserve account, they encountered the problem

existing resources for

community

services while keeping the hospitals

could be emptied. This was a formidable task.

the end of January 1992,

was then
it

and convinced

governor forged ahead. At a press con-

DMH administrators first had to close the hospitals before any savings could be

realized. Operating with

of

firmly committed to his restructuring

his commission's plan

DMH had closed Metropolitan State Hospital, which

the largest public mental hospital in Massachusetts.

With a 412-bed

capacity,

served twenty-three communities located within the greater Boston metropolitan

region. Five

months

later, in

June 1992, Danvers State Hospital, which serviced the

northeastern region with 155 beds,

was

closed.

As a subsequent recommendation of the

governor's commission, the Gaebler Children's Center, which housed 56 emotionally

was closed in September 1992.
Northampton was the only state hospital in the
hinterland of western Massachusetts. It housed 145 patients and operated under a courtordered consent decree. The legislative delegation from this region was strongly opposed to its closing, fearing the prospect of losing a major business that would have a
negative impact on the local economy. It therefore gave Commissioner Elias an exceedingly hard time and tried to persuade her to change her mind. Despite these strenuous
objections, Northampton was closed on August 26, 1993.
Because of the perceived benefits of privatization, the Weld initiative prevailed. It
had considerable appeal. The fact that the general public was angry with state govern-

disturbed children under the age of fourteen,

But already a reaction was

setting in.

19

ment fueled support for Weld's program. Public opinion polls indicated as much. A poll
conducted by the Becker Institute in 1993 showed that 53 percent of those surveyed
approved of privatization, while 39 percent were opposed to it. A similar poll commissioned by the Boston Globe showed a favorable rating of 45 percent and an unfavorable
rating of 33 percent.

The

12

between

trade-offs

ideology and political reality are always tricky,

political

This restructuring program
by the governor's special
commission, it estimated that closing the three adult mental hos-pitals would save the
state $36.94 million annually in net operating expenses and another $40.03 million in

whether played out nationally or

at the state

proved to be no exception. According

and local

levels.

to the figures released

capital costs. Considering Metropolitan State Hospital

closure

would

result in operating savings of

in capital savings.

itself,

they estimated that

its

13

who

These cost-benefit arguments did not sway those
hospital closings

by

$12.93 million annually and $16.78 million

would forever preclude a safety net

believed that the proposed

for the mentally

ill.

Skeptics ques-

tioned the accuracy of these figures. Despite their differences in numbers, most of
the

money saved was

reallocated to financing a

wide array of community

services, facil-

itating greater patient access,

and expanding appropriate care options. Mental health

professionals considered this

method of

stigmatizing than institutional care.

residential care

more

A similar managed care

Medicaid expenditures, was evident

in public welfare.

With

cost-effective and less

approach, aimed
this

Division of Medical Assistance contracted with Mental Health

at

reducing

goal in mind, the

Management of America,

a private vendor, to deliver mental health and substance-abuse services to Medicaid
recipients.

These were fundamental

shifts in

conventional definitions of mission, in

development of resources, financial and human, and
health services. Case

in the physical siting of

management, however, was not

privatized. All in

all, it

mental
represented

a major restructuring of the mental health care system in Massachusetts.

Not

surprisingly, labor unions strongly

ing that closures
state

would

significantly

workers already laid off owing

that increasing privatization of the

opposed the hospital reduction

worsen the intolerable
budget

to severe

Union Local 509

Furthermore, they argued

mental health system would lead to disparities in the

quality of services for the profoundly mentally

International

cuts.

policy, argu-

situation of hundreds of

ill.

In late 1991 the Service

filed suit against the

Weld

Employees

administration, charging

it

with illegally implementing privatization of the mental health system. The suit accused
state officials

vate agencies.

of illegally laying off more than 800 state employees

Many

wage and

providers, but at lower

benefit rates.

the unions continued their efforts to roll

The

who worked

in pri-

of the discharged state workers were then rehired by private

back

Although the

litigation

was unsuccessful,

state privatization policies.

from the closings made most state legislators unhappy. Weld's
program was anathema to Democrats on Beacon Hill, who, by the end
of 1993, mounted a concerted counterattack. The Senate Committee on Post Audit and
political fallout

restructuring

Oversight criticized

DMH for not having enough private hospital beds available before

closing Northampton. 14

The House Committee on Post Audit and Oversight, chaired
by Democrat William Nagle of Northampton, was even more critical. In December 1993
state senator

ited a state

Marc Pacheco, a Democrat of Taunton, introduced

agency from privatizing services unless

10 percent of

its

costs.

his legislative district,

Pacheco feared

would be

that

the next

it

legislation that prohib-

could prove a

minimum

saving of

Taunton State Hospital, which was located

one closed. Pacheco's "antiprivatization"
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was vetoed by Governor Weld, but the Democrats mustered the necessary two-thirds
vote in each house to override his veto, and it became law. In July 1994 the irate lawmakers overrode another gubernatorial veto of a

legislative rider attached to an "outside

section" of the budget that prohibited the closing of any

Framing

the Issue:

Why

more

state hospitals.

Close Metropolitan State?

This study focuses on the impact of the consolidation and transfer of services
ropolitan State Hospital as a point of departure.
tions that did not yield easy answers.

the clients in

its

Why

The episode

at

Met-

raised several hard ques-

What would happen

such a major change?

to

custody? Where would they go? Could they be transferred to alternative

community group homes without jeopardizing their health and
Could the Department of Mental Health protect the safety of the larger society
and the rights of the mentally ill at the same time? What would happen to the clinical
treatment staff and other hospital personnel who faced imminent layoffs? Could they
hospital facilities or

safety?

find jobs elsewhere in the system?

These questions of public policy and public management and
been debated with increasing fervor for the past
in the policy option of deinstitutionalization,

thirty years.

which resulted

have

their ramifications

They found

their origins

in the wholesale discharge

of patients that started in the sixties and continued throughout the seventies. This controversial reform

exposed the cracks in the system, which in turn led to the

round

first

The following sections summarize the painful hismistakes that were made along the way. Acknowledging

of hospital closings in the mid-1970s.
tory of these efforts and the

the embarrassing failures of deinstitutionalization, one

Why
that

again?

it

Why now? If this

would succeed

this

time?

What was

must ask the obvious questions,

what made the policymakers think

strategy failed then,

the critical difference?

As

discussed

later,

these are developments worth examining.

Opened in 1929 on the eve of the Great Depression, Met State, as it was popularly
known, had been in operation for sixty-three years. During this extended period it
had provided both acute and long-term care for patients suffering from various mental
and personality disorders. Over the years thousands upon thousands of patients had been
treated there
lies

on

who found

their road to recovery or stability.

troubled member.
areas.

Most

referrals originated with fami-

themselves unable to cope with the bizarre and erratic behavior of a

The

from three of DMH's nine catchment
area; the Beaverbrook-Concord which encompassed the cities of Everett,

hospital admitted people

These included the Cambridge-Somerville

Mystic Valley area; and the Tri-City area,

Maiden, and Medford.

As

it

desired.

happened, the quality of care

Most of its

at

Met

State in the late 1980s left

patients suffered severe mental illnesses ranging

schizophrenia to bipolar disorder.

Some

much

to

be

from paranoid

of these illnesses are associated with chemical

changes in the brain, which caused their victims to lose touch with

reality.

Theirs was a

world haunted by failed treatments and fearful delusions and hallucinations. Those
suffered psychotic relapses returned to the hospital for repeated commitments.

recidivism rate was fairly high.
tion

—

The most

costly aspect of mental health

the average cost per patient per year at

Met

State in 1991

is

who

The

hospitaliza-

was $98,500. By

marked contrast, a similar stay at a community setting cost, on average, $55,000 per
15
client, which included residential, day, and support services.
In carrying out its responsibilities, Met State was plagued by numerous problems.

21

Client concerns that had been so troubling to so
ciencies and staffing shortages being

among

many were

legendary, serious care defi-

the most prevalent. 16 This led to

many

reports of abuses, for example, individuals being misdiagnosed or overdrugged and

neglected in back wards.

The

factors accounting for these

problems were both episodic

and long term. After beginning with high hopes and large budgetary outlays, Met State
prospered in its early years. Before long it encountered financial problems and found
itself continually

underfunded and understaffed. Year

sive expansions and contractions of public

funding explains in large measure
to cycles of

why

and

and incompetence. For better or worse,

By

1991

year

it

experienced succes-

the hospital declined. Indeed,

reform and retrenchment, nor was

passage of time and change.

after

political support. This pattern of unstable

it

it

it

it

was no stranger

spared from sordid scandal, corruption,

had weathered these storms and withstood the

had become a remnant of a bygone era when

bigger and better hospitals were seen as the only viable option for the mentally sick.

The decision
tion of

was based

to close Metropolitan State

largely

on the worn-out condi-

buildings, their replacement value, maintenance, and capital funding, and their

its

was
was the excess capac-

physical and functional obsolescence. In short, this sprawling hospital complex
underutilized and too expensive to operate. Another consideration
ity

of private hospitals in the local area. Adopting conventional cost-benefit analysis

and long established

criteria

used

special

commission concluded

ment."

It

politely explained

its

in hospital consolidations

that

Met

rationale this

The Metropolitan campus was

built in

and mergers, the governor's

State lacked an appropriate "physical environ-

way:

two groups of buildings. The buildings are

fair

condition but are inappropriately built for today's health care standards.

add

to inefficient operating costs for staffing, energy, security,

maintenance. The

site utility structures

newer portion of the campus for 120 instituThese funds would be

beds and 80 transitional beds approaches $17 million

more appropriately invested

Met

in

communications, and

and power plant are original and need significant

repairs/rebuilding. Estimates to rebuild the
tional

in

The layouts

.

.

community programs and other

.

state facilities.

17

was one of the most inefficient and least cost-effective hospitals
it had become a proverbial white elephant. Like a rusty
old battleship about to be withdrawn from active service, this imposing hospital facility
was ready to be decommissioned and mothballed. From start to finish, the two-stage
decommissioning process took fourteen months to complete. The initial phasedown took
place during the eight months from November 1990 to June 1991. The second stage
began shortly thereafter and concluded when Marylou Sudders, its chief operating officer, closed its doors on January 31, 1992. In truth, the decision to close Met State had
been in the works for some time. It was implicitly made by Dukakis and explicitly
affirmed by Weld. In retrospect, there was not much question about closing Met State at
this juncture. Considering the downsizing that was already taking place, the hospital was
on its way out by the time Weld assumed power.
With Met State's continued existence threatened, its 827 employees were confused
and outraged at this turn of events. They were not only afraid of losing their jobs,
but they also displayed a human anxiety that was deeply rooted in individual self-worth.
Worried employees asked each other, "What will happen to us once the hospital is
shut down? Will we lose our jobs and have to go on unemployment? Or can we exercise
our bumping rights and get transferred to other state hospitals?" The closing evoked
deep emotions that ranged from fear of the new to maintaining things as they are.
Clearly,

in the system.

State

At

this point
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Unwilling to see Met State expire, they engaged

Like their counterparts

survival.

at

in a

power struggle

for institutional

Danvers and Northampton, who faced a similar

predicament, they fought hard to keep the hospital open. Reluctance and resistance to

change was extraordinary, especially when imposed from outside.

were even more upset. After

Patients and their families
lose.

The

that, the

would

families feared that their relatives

all,

they had the most to

lose their social safety net.

sudden modification of conditions disrupted the normal routine of

Not only

patients.

meant breaking up their social networks and the continuity of their clinical treatment
was an integral part of their support system. Closing the hospital caused severe
hardship and required adjustments for all parties involved. The whole episode provided
a compelling example of organizational change in a volatile environment.
Trying to anticipate the consequences of their actions proved especially important to
It

that

They sensed the probable organizational impact and understood
would cause much pain and anxiety. Consequently, they devised strategies to help
the affected stakeholders cope with their losses, both real and imagined. Most important
of all, they wanted to maintain the clinical integrity of the process. Related to this,
and a matter that sharpened each of the issues they faced, was the complexity of transferring patients to alternative care facilities without compromising their health and
safety. For many this involved moving from a restrictive setting to a less restrictive one.
It was an enormously complicated task that was fraught with risk as well as the uncertainties and complexities inherent in organizational reality. A few months beforehand,
a class- action lawsuit had been filed by lawyers who sought to protect the basic civil
the administrators.
that

it

rights of patients. This raised the question of

whether cooperation among the parties

involved in the closure process could flourish or whether the arena was destined to be
adversarial.

As

principal participants reconstruct the Metropolitan State case, the

involvement was extensive.

It

advocates. After stubborn resistance at the outset,

advance of the closing. But

management did not come

community

included consumers, families, employees, trustees, and
all parties

eventually signed on in

appearance of cooperation on the part of both labor and

this

easy.

The

administrators had to invent

new ways of

allow-

ing the various stakeholders to participate in the planning and decision-making processes that affected their lives so deeply.

To acknowledge sharply divergent views,
all showed

mutual accommodations and adjustments were the order of the day. They
genuine respect and sympathy for the patients.
Ultimately,

work

it

was

this sense

of shared purpose that

closely together. Labor relations in the past had

process and as an impediment to
a viable framework for talks
sides.

For

starters,

was

new

policies.

The

made it possible for them to
much to be desired, both

left

as a

failure of past attempts to create

attributable to the lack of trust

and

credibility

on both

DMH placed a hiring freeze on all job vacancies and promised to
first crack at them. The major negotiations
employee unions and the senior management team took place

give Metropolitan State employees the

among
at

the nine public

the hospital site in Waltham. Specific grievances were handled at the Office of

Employee Relations in Boston. In conjunction with state employee unions, DMH set
up an Office of Competitive Bidding to assist employees in bidding on contracted
work. What emerged was a policy process that mixed outside and inside participation.
Herbert Kaufman has identified three internal reasons why organizations resist
change. First, there are almost always contradictory judgments made by the members
of an organization as to whether the change

is

23

necessary. Second, ineffective deci-

making processes usually obtain. Third, the implementation of new directions
slippage between decision and action occurs because the instructions
are likely to be ambiguous or impractical or require that members cease what they are
accustomed to doing and do something different. 18
Reinforcing Kaufman's explanation of organizational resistance to change is the theory of escalating commitment to the status quo. Institutional officials, employees, and
constituency groups become so emotionally, intellectually, financially, and structurally
committed to an ongoing pattern of behavior that they inevitably find themselves buried
"knee deep in the big muddy." 19 This resistance to change is intensified when an individual or group perceives itself as personally responsible for an action or outcome so that
stubbornness compounds formal commitment and informal lethargy. Furthermore, civil
service rules and collective bargaining agreements make it extremely difficult to termision

is

imperfect

—

nate state employees.

All these factors were present in one form or another and in varying degrees in the
closing of

Met

State. Failure to consider

them promised a recipe

for disaster.

The

well-organized state employee unions wielded substantial power as did the medical
clinicians,

who saw

their authority

contending forces was

felt.

tance and dealt with

as sensibly

it

and professional

For the most

turf

on the

line.

The

full

range of

part, the administrators anticipated the resis-

and expeditiously as possible. They had to manage a

and more demanding organizational change. For them, knowledge of

different

how

a

mixed version of headquarters-field and site-based organizations work was essential to
achieving their goals. They realized early on that if not handled properly, layoffs and
employee bumping rights could prove disastrous. The same was true with regard to the
legal implications of the transfer of each client. The whole operation could easily have
become unraveled if they had gotten tied up in adversarial litigation and time-consuming court delays.

one comes away generally impressed with the orderly
which Met State was closed. Although not all the participants

Sifting through the evidence,

and

efficient

manner

in

and observers will agree with

this general conclusion, the plain fact is that the closure

was implemented with considerable
as secretary of

human

success. Critics, like Philip Johnston,

services under

Governor Dukakis, charged

who

served

that the hospital clos-

As he saw it,
outcome was the direct result of a coalition of strange political bedfellows, including
the budget cutters and antihospital ideologues. 20 Other critics complained vociferously
that many patients were transferred to facilities that did not provide the "equal or better"
settings they had originally been promised.
As far as the media were concerned, the partisan Boston Globe directed the most fire
at DMH in general and Commissioner Elias in particular. The agency also took a pounding from other media observers. Perhaps the most searing criticism was leveled by Mark
Lecesse, the political editor of the Boston Tab. In an article titled "Too Much, Too Fast,"
ings were entirely budget driven and had nothing to do with mental health.
the

he wrote:

The Weld administration has spent

three years closing state mental hospitals

ing out services to private contractors.
state

mental hospitals nearly in

half,

It

and farm-

has cut the number of long-term patients in

and the

toll

on the mentally

ill,

especially children,

has begun to show. 21

Coupled with

this

barrage of criticism was the accusation that privatization amounted
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union busting and that Weld was hostile toward state employees. These explanations

to

have some merit, yet they are not entirely convincing. Whatever the variance

in

opin-

few informed observers could quarrel with the key fact that the
Met State closing did work. It was a bold stroke well executed. Community involvement was as pivotal at Met State as it was at Danvers and Northampton.
What follows then, drawn from imperfect documentation and even more imperfect
memory, is a plausible but not definitive reconstruction of the rise and fall of Metropolions and perceptions,

itan State Hospital. It traces the evolution

and

in terms of both history
political

environment

ical, legal,

political

human

economic and

which the demise of the hospital took place. They

in

treat the clin-

resources, and labor-relations constraints involved, as well as the

and personal agendas

reflectively

of the mental health system in Massachusetts

policy. Successive sections characterize the

that influenced the decision.

what lessons there are

The

last sections

But the reader must remember

for today.

suggest

that these

conclusions are those of a political scientist, not a mental health professional.

The

Policy Process

In elaborating

and Bureaucratic Setting

on the key features of the Massachusetts mental health care system, one
is far more a life unto itself than even Max Weber imag-

observes that the bureaucracy

and organizational terms,

ined. In policy

it

oversees program development. The state

no

complex system. Over
that sets policy and

clearly qualifies as a

Department of Mental Health has evolved into an agency

time, the

is

the sole mental health authority, for there

county mental health control as exists in other

local or

The

states.

is

central actors in

DMH policymaking — politicians, administrators, and medical experts — provide most
of the ideas for most of the strategy in the various phases of the process.

what

is

now known

DMH bureaucracy has a life of

its

own,

the involvement of the private sector in
ship.

These

attributes are

While the

omous
it

on the

has limited agency discretion.

also features

rise.

agency reporting directly

line

It

as public-private partner-

The

to the

it

no longer operates as an auton-

governor as

it

statutory mission of

once previously

DMH

did.

Thus,

broadly defined

is

"to provide for services to citizens with long-term or serious mental illness, early

ongoing treatment of mental

illness,

and research into the causes of mental

and

illness."

The

department also assumes responsibility for providing emergency services to adults,

and adolescents who experience a psychiatric

children,

Back

in April 1971,

crisis and request assistance.
Governor Francis Sargent reorganized the executive branch of

new super agency known as the Executive
which was then responsible for both the mentally

Massachusetts state government, creating a
Office of

Human

Services.

retarded and the mentally

As

DMH,

ill,

was placed under

its

jurisdiction

and budgetary control.

a result of this reorganization, the commissioner of mental health reports to the

governor through the secretary of
mental health advocates,
lenge the

way

In 1972,

in

which

who

human

services.

To make

things

more complicated,

tend to be adversarial, began using legal means to chal-

DMH administered

Benjamin Ricci, an

activist

its facilities.

from Amherst,

filed

a class-action lawsuit

on behalf of a group of clients at the state school for the mentally
Belchertown who were subjected to dreadful living conditions. The case

against the department

retarded in

of Ricci
its

v.

Greenblatt triggered other lawsuits that sought to hold

DMH accountable for

alleged neglect and mistreatment of clients. Since the civil rights of the patients

were involved,

this litigation

wound up

in federal district court,

25

where

it

was assigned

to

Subsuming all these issues under a consent degree, Tauro
improvements
ordered certain
to be made at these institutions. Subsequently, in 1986,

federal judge Joseph Tauro.

DMH was split into two separate agencies. The legislature created a new Department of
Mental Retardation, which necessitated a

and

parallel bureaucracy

parallel funding.

After retaining jurisdiction of the case for twenty-one years, Tauro finally disengaged on

May

25, 1993.

Operating under this structural
its

own

turf.

abuse, yet

fluidity,

DMH no longer had exclusive command of

For example, the Department of Public Health

is

responsible for substance

DMH treated many substance abusers. A web of intricate relationships —

contracts, interagency agreements, intergovernmental grants

agencies together in almost every important endeavor.

It is

— bind public and

private

under these policies and

programs, which are multiagency, multigovernmental, and both public and private in
character, that
elites.

perform the
tional

DMH administrators are frequently required to work with intervening
women

Functioning always under powerful political oversight, these
critical role

programs

Since

its

and men

of turning simplistic and often contradictory policies into opera-

that the street-level bureaucracy

can carry out.

inception in 1938, the Department of Mental Health has functioned as a

headquarters-field organization with

Boston. In 1990

its

field operations

its

central office located at the state capital in

were divided

area offices, which were scattered across the

into seven regions

state.

and twenty-four

Later that year commissioner Henry

Tomes decided to reorganize the department with the intention of giving area direc22
tors more power and keeping case managers in area offices. This decision was driven
by budgetary and political constraints. To trim expenses in hard times, Tomes put a
stop to the leasing of expensive area offices. With Medicaid picking up the cost, the

made a policy decision in 1990 to launch clozapine trials, for DMH wanted to
this new medication available to more patients. The advent of clozapine was expected to have a significant impact on the management of serious mental illness, and it
was hoped it would help to reduce the future need for long inpatient stays.
As state employees, DMH personnel are part of the permanent civil service, workstate

make

ing regular hours in regular places. Their behavior

and directives formulated

at

governed by

is

rules, regulations,

headquarters with the expectation of uniform responses in

the field. Field actions, which are routinely reviewed at headquarters, can vary

the

way from

surreptitious evasion

embracing the opportunity

and outright obstructionism

to initiate reform. Beset

all

to enthusiastically

by conflicting demands from the

known to distance themselves from area directors and hospital administrators, especially when trouble arises or policy initiatives
go awry. In bureaucratic parlance, this difficult terrain is known as the quicksand of
field, central office

personnel have been

bureaucracy where the footing

Throughout

its

as a site- specific organization

Located off Trapelo Road

and a

staff

is

slippery and at times treacherous.

sixty-three-year history, Metropolitan State Hospital had operated

in

where bureaucrats and

Waltham,

it

was run

in

clients coexisted with

one another.

1990 by a chief operating officer

of physicians, nurses, hospital attendants, social workers, security guards,

and building managers. As one participant recalls, "Met State was a fiefdom in and of
23
itself; it had its own rules and its own code of conduct."
Most of its employees worked
in rotating shifts around the clock. The hospital was a highly labor-intensive enterprise
that typically allocated about 85 percent of

its

explains,

26

budget

to personnel.

As Robert Wood
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These organizations have

which "service-providers" and

visible physical structures in

"service-receivers" live together continually or for a substantial portion of the day. There
are aspects of

communities here

—

entire cultures with

mores and practices

indigenous and with attitudes never described in manuals. They bear
to the offices

agencies.

not

to five is not the order of the day. Site-based organizations

to the usual rules.

State,

it is

is

McLean

simply do

24

the distinction between public and private hospitals

the most notable example

Met

that are

resemblance

of motor vehicle, employment, transportation, and economic development

Nine

work according

Making

little

is

also useful. Perhaps

Hospital in Belmont. Located one mile from

a teaching hospital that offers high-quality care, but serves a

ent client population, a

more

affluent

and

less

much

differ-

troublesome group than was likely to

at Metropolitan State. Although McLean provides substantial free care, it admits
who are less disturbed and have the ability to pay. This practice is called creaming. By marked contrast, Met State accepted anyone who needed help regardless of
individuals' financial circumstances. Its patients were among the most disturbed and the

appear

those

most vulnerable. Lacking medical insurance, they were unable to pay. That there are
similarities and differences between public and private hospitals is hardly surprising, but
the inequities are striking. All of which underscored the fact that there was a two-tier
mental health system operating in Massachusetts, one for the rich and upper-middle
class

and one for the poor and dispossessed. 25

The Evolution of the Mental Health System
It is

important to examine

how

the state mental health system evolved. Historically, of

course, Massachusetts has been in the vanguard of caring for the mentally
in building a series of public
until the first quarter

asylums that became

its

trademark.

From

ill,

a pioneer

colonial times

of the nineteenth century, the insane had been kept in local

and county almshouses or with family and friends. Founded

in 1830,

jails

under the leader-

ship of Horace Mann, the first state mental hospital in America was built in Worcester
on a site overlooking Lake Quinsigamond, opening in 1833. Administered by Samuel
Woodward, its influential and well-respected superintendent, this hospital became a
model for the rest of the nation to emulate. Originally designed to accommodate 120
patients,

By 1850

Worcester served three basic functions: treatment, custody, and social control.
it

had more than 500

remember

patients.

26

most of the govgovernment played a smaller role. The
tradition of local autonomy, which began in colonial times, was strong in New England,
and states' rights reached its zenith in the Civil War. Not since anti -Federalist days
had the fervor of grassroots democracy and states' rights burned more brightly. Other
states followed the lead of Massachusetts, and by 1844 eleven of the existing twenty-six
states had public asylums.
In 1839 the city of Boston established its own asylum for the insane on 214 acres
of prime land in Mattapan. This was a time when Irish immigrants arrived in Boston in
great numbers. Strangers in a new land, mired in abject poverty, and devout in their
Catholicism, these urban newcomers confronted a hostile environment. Fear and antipathy toward Irish Catholics had reached new heights in 1834 when an angry mob
of nativists set fire to a convent in Charlestown, where Ursuline nuns ran a boarding
It is

well to

erning in America.

By

that during the Jacksonian era the states did

contrast, the national

27

school for children. The intensity of hatred between Catholics and Protestants continued
for generations as they fought over their ethnic

and religious differences. The unprece-

dented flood of emigration from Ireland during the late
nativists

even more as the

Irish fled their

ravages and devastation of the "great hunger." Almost

from families who

840s and early

1

1

850s shocked

famine- stricken homeland to escape the
all

these people were descended

had clung to their faith through centuries of persecution. Their lives

were scarred by starvation and disease, humiliation, and brutal oppression
of the British.

27

In antebellum Boston, the Irish underclass

nated against as

much

as, if

not

more

were caught up

abhorred slavery,

at the

than, the black underclass. Abolitionists,

in their

own moral

hands

was despised and discrimi-

who

self-righteousness and the glory

of their cause.
In 1841 Dorothea Dix discovered widespread neglect and abuse of the mentally
in Massachusetts. Starting in East

almshouses, locked in

cellars,

Cambridge, she found them chained in

and determination, she worked

islature for

expanded

facilities

and lay reformers believed

ill

and

and isolated on farms. Appalled by what she saw, Dix

spearheaded a personal crusade for their humane treatment.
grit

jails

tirelessly in their behalf

and proper

that insanity

institutional care.

was

as curable as

A social reformer with true
and lobbied the
28

state leg-

In Dix's time, psychiatrists

most other ailments. Confine-

ment, they insisted, was not a punishment but a cure. Given the extent of medical

knowledge

in 1833, there

was

little

to

be done beyond the anticipated curative powers

of the asylum. All these factors gave rise to the cult of curability.

Over the course of the next

century, Massachusetts developed an elaborate network

of public asylums. At the outset, the state and local governments shared responsibility
for mental health.

According to

historical accounts, state funds

the buildings and the superintendent's salary, but
at the local level.

much

were used

to

pay for

of the financial burden remained

Counties, towns, and villages paid a per capita fee for their indigent

patients, but local officials

tended to be parsimonious. Most of the state hospitals

were constructed during the second half of the nineteenth century, which was the heyday of the "moral treatment" movement. These lunatic asylums, as they were commonly

known, came on
at

line

one

at

a time, each in response to a distinct need. Overcrowding

Worcester led to the creation of new asylums

1858.

Each served a

at

Taunton in 1854 and Northampton

localized area but accepted patients

Upper-class Yankees,

who were

from other

in

parts of the state.

mostly Whigs and abolitionist Republicans, com-

farming towns where
them from the community. Such a serene and idyllic environment afforded patients plenty of fresh air and a retreat from the pressures
of modern society while contributing to their physical health and vigor. The patients
were sealed off from the outside world and wrapped in protective custody. Little thought
was given to the stigma that such isolation and social exclusion imposed. Pejorative

prised the ruling

land

elite.

They

was cheap, purposely

sited these hospitals in quiet, rural

separating

terms such as "lunatics," the "nut house," and "funny farms," were even more stigmatizing.

The general

public considered insanity a shameful form of deviance. 29

They viewed

victims as social misfits.
Individual hospitals were operated independently by a board of lay trustees appointed

by the governor. This made them accountable to the public, but the psychiatrists com-

The trustees hired superintendents to manage the asylums.
Hundreds of employees were needed to staff the wards of these large hospitals and
to maintain their physical plants. Most of the hired staff were native-born white AngloSaxon Protestants who lived on the hospital grounds in dormitories built for this pur-

plained about lay control.

28
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They usually managed

pose.

to get their family

members

put on the payroll, and before

long nepotism became rampant. Social and recreational activities were organized to

promote

staff morale. Interfaith

and Catholic chapels for religious worship were eventu-

on each campus. In many ways these asylums became self-contained com-

ally built

munities that contributed to the local economy.

Much

of the hospital land was used for farming. Patients were put to work tending

the crops and large dairy herds.

The revenues earned from

the sale of such agricultural

produce went to defray operating costs. Under the 1864—1885 superintendency of Pliny
Earle,

Northampton had the most efficient patient work program in the country. The
was virtually self-supporting. As historian Michael Moore observes:

hospital

The

patients

were

humane and

to receive

dignified treatment under the watchful eye

and direct care of the superintendent, the doctor
administrative detail of the hospital.

and a

activity

the

ill

back

tightly regulated schedule, this

to health.

who

Combined with

attended to every medical and
regular physical and intellectual

system of "moral treatment" would lead

Both the location and the physical design of the buildings were

intended to enhance the therapeutic effect of the hospital. 30

During the

late nineteenth

cultural to a largely

Age, more diverse in

Up

century Massachusetts went from a largely rural and agri-

urban and industrial
its

state. Its society

was

different in the Gilded

demographic pluralism and more demanding

in the workplace.

most emigrants had come from the British Isles, France, Germany, and
the Scandinavian countries. The diversity of emigration then began to change dramatito that time

cally.

By

the

1

Europe, from
uania,

890s the majority of emigrants were coming from southern and eastern

Italy,

Hungary, Greece, and the Balkan countries as well as Poland, Lith-

and Russia. They were recruited as a source of cheap labor

mills, leather tanneries,

and shoe

to

work

in the textile

factories. Their assimilation into the larger society

was slow and painful. In the meantime, the downtrodden Irish, who suffered depression,
anxiety, and distress, had filled the asylums. David Mechanic has described their plight
worthy of lengthy quotation:

in language

The general contempt of Massachusetts
tuted a

pital to take

on many new

it

was impossible

to increasing pressures

who

consti-

on the mental hos-

—

the mass
With the growing number of patients
community as well as by mental hospital personnel

patients.

of them held in low esteem by the

—

society for the Irish immigrants,

growing proportion of the insane, led

to maintain the administrative

sary for moral treatment. Moreover, with a

and environmental

attitudes neces-

growing number of patients and limited

re-

was necessary to develop more efficient custodial attitudes and procedures.
The contempt in which the hospital held its clients and the low social value accorded
them by the society at large neither stimulated hospital administrators to demand greater
sources,

it

resources to care for their patients nor encouraged the community to provide further

and more intensive support. 31

Whatever the difficulties, the incidence of mental illness was on the rise. Insanity
was defined vaguely enough to permit egregious admissions. The wording of the law
was so vague that it could be applied to persons whose real problems were poverty,
homelessness, and physical disability. Under such conditions, unprecedented numbers
of people were declared insane and confined to mental hospitals. The sheer magnitude
of the problem resulted in overcrowded and understaffed asylums. Madness was growing at a rate

much

faster than society could

cope with

29

it.

Party politics and patronage also influenced the growth and expansion of asylums.
social control institutions, such as prisons and reformatories, public asylums
were viewed as lucrative sources of jobs and contracts that party politicians could
bestow as a reward to their loyal supporters. Steeped in this political culture, Massachusetts built several hospitals during the post-Civil War era. A palatial asylum designed
and built on a grand scale was erected at Danvers on a hill overlooking the countryside.
With iron bars placed across its windows, this facility was completed in 1878 at a cost

Like other

of more than $1.5 million, an expenditure deemed extravagant

—

at the time.

Before the

at Westborough in 1886, Foxborend of the century three other asylums appeared
ough in 1893, and Medfield in 1896. These institutions made new spaces available and

gave local

officials a

good excuse

financial burden to the state.

to redefine their senile

poor as insane and

shift the

32

There were then 219 almshouses in Massachusetts, which were populated by the

homeless poor, the disabled and drunkards, vagrants and
of

whom were

immigrants.

As

common

criminals,

many

reformers succeeded in closing these institutions, state

asylums were forced to absorb increasing numbers of the aged poor. Almshouses

at

Bridgewater, Monson, and Tewksbury, established in the early 1850s, were converted
into public asylums for the mentally

ill

and mentally retarded. Bridgewater became

a prison hospital for the criminally insane. Operated as a

now

falls

maximum

security prison,

it

under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.

These public asylums were overseen and inspected at least twice a year by a state
Board of Health, Lunacy, and Charity, which was created in 1 879. This agency was
replaced in 1886 by the state Board of Lunacy and Charity, which in turn was replaced
by the state Board of Insanity in 1898. Many reformers, who favored centralized administration of asylums, argued that they were vulnerable to patronage. Despite this concern, the asylums jealously guarded their local autonomy and enlisted important political support

When

when

a governor or a state agency threatened to tighten central control.

a serious threat to their independence arose, local officials could be expected to

voice strong objections. With the Republicans securely in control of state politics, the

asylum system increasingly served

as a patronage vehicle for their party.

Expansion of the public asylums took place

in close correlation

with the rise of the

Progressive movement. Since the medical profession claimed responsibility for treating
insanity, citizen influence

be

was only peripheral

to the closed

sure, the doctors exercised absolute control,

world of the asylum. To

and the public came

to accept a

medical

explanation of madness. John Sutton argues as follows:
Late nineteenth-century policies toward the insane and the poor were premised on an
ideology that portrayed social problems as fundamentally individual and moral in origin.

Throughout the Progressive
ideology gradually gave

of individualism remained

Given the
1901

at the

state's

era, the

way

to a

intact.

imagery of Protestant moralism that underlay

33

expansion mode, another public asylum appeared

dawn of the

twentieth century. Three years

full financial responsibility for

care of the insane.

As a

later, in

at

in

1908 for the sum of $1 million. Seven years

appeared, this one

at

Grafton.

It

came on

line

30

when

Gardner

result of this takeover,

later, in

in

1904, the state assumed

chusetts entered into negotiations with the city of Boston and purchased

asylum

this

medical model of deviance, but the basic discourse

its

Massa-

municipal

1915, yet another asylum

the nation witnessed the

emergence
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of the mental hygiene movement.
eradicated through education in
In

Its

proponents argued that mental illness could be

human

relationships, but the millennium failed to arrive.

due course, moral treatment was replaced by a focus on the incurability of psychiat-

ric

disorders and the somatic basis of mental disease.

Research was a luxury that most mental institutions could not afford. The Boston
Psychopathic Hospital was an exception. Established in 1912 as the research arm of

Boston State Hospital,
mental

illness.

As

it

new medical approaches for combating
the mecca of psychiatry in America.

sought to develop

a result, Boston soon

became

While Boston State served the "incurable" of the day, the experimental Boston Psychopathic attempted to accommodate "incipient, acute, and curable insanity." This teaching and research center was renamed the Massachusetts Mental Health Center in 1956.

On

a smaller scale, a pathology laboratory

under the direction of Solomon Carter

was established

at

Westborough.

It

operated

Fuller, a distinguished black neuropsychiatrist

who conducted

research on the biological influences of mental health.
Meanwhile Massachusetts, like the rest of the country, had swung from the conservatism of Grover Cleveland and William McKinley to the progressivism of Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and, in the 1920s, back to the conservatism of Calvin
Coolidge and Herbert Hoover. At this time Metropolitan State appeared at Waltham, the
last asylum to come on line. It was the biggest and most modern hospital in MassachuCollectively, these thirteen state institutions functioned as an extended system that

setts.

proved beneficial

As

and towns. 34

state hospitals gradually fell into a long,

cold slide of de-

in the long run

would have serious negative consequences. Even-

system would break down, but long before reaching the point of collapse

found ways to correct
fiscal

cities

circumstances largely beyond their control. Incremental decisions were

made which

tually the

of the state's 351

went on, the

the years

cline, victims to

being

to all

itself.

it

Operating on tight budgets, the hospitals struggled with

problems, staff reductions, low morale, and the departure of clinicians. Continual

turnover and staff burnout became a perennial problem. Party politics and patronage
also contributed to their decline.
itics

during the

first

While the Republicans continued

to

dominate

state pol-

half of the twentieth century, the construction and maintenance of

asylums channeled

state and local patronage to loyalists of both major parties.
Through the New Deal, the Fair Deal, and the Eisenhower administration, the public
asylums became more custodial than therapeutic, dumping grounds for those afflicted
with alcoholism, epilepsy, senility, and other chronic geriatric illnesses. Admitted and
left to be forgotten, these people were consigned to living and dying in these instititions.
As was true in other states, the asylums had become human storage bins that were abusive, uncaring,

Ward,

and unresponsive. In 1946 they were dubbed snake

who wrote

pits

by Mary Jane

a graphic, personal account of her incarceration in a state hospital. Her

The Snake Pit, was made into a movie in 1948.
The demanding nature of care for the mentally ill, has always taken a toll among
those who provide it, for they have found their jobs filled with stress and tension. They
are constantly exposed to physical danger and assaults by violent patients. Says one

best-selling book,

observer,

The

state hospital

was a hard place

to

work. Hospital workers provided care to

of the neediest members of society, people

They provided

this care at a hospital that

who

many

often could get help nowhere else.

was constantly underfunded and over-

31

crowded, as part of a system which often thwarted
the stigma that haunts the mentally

good and caring people who

and control of the

evolve. In sparse outline,
the creation of a

in

their best intentions.

in their efforts to achieve greater centralized adminis-

state hospitals, inevitably, the
it

They endured

our society. Most of these employees were

hard to help their patients. 35

tried

Although reformers persisted
tration

ill

bureaucracy continued to

passed through successive stages of evolution that witnessed

Commission of Mental Diseases

in 1916, a

Department of Mental

Diseases in 1919, and finally a Department of Mental Health in 1938. 36

emphasis, then, was constricted.

and the molding of people
the outbreak of

World War

It

to fit the
II

DMH's

system rather than the search for alternatives. With

and the

staffing shortages that resulted

from emergency

wartime mobilization, the major emphasis was placed on occupational
Psychia-trists in

America played an important

treating soldiers

who broke down

rehabilitation.

role in screening military recruits

and in

mentally under the prolonged stress of combat. After

the war, the establishment of the National Institute of Mental Health in 1948

watershed event legitimating a new federal role

The old

initial

stressed the overriding importance of state hospitals

in

was a

mental health.

pressures, already identified, returned to the 1950s agenda. Staff shortages

continued to be a major problem. Because better-paying jobs were offered elsewhere,
it

became increasingly

difficult to recruit

and

retain a reliable workforce. Replacements,

while available, were not always of the best quality;
ified.

As more

many were

psychiatrists practiced privately to earn

at state hospitals.

untrained and unqual-

more income, they shunned work

Foreign physicians were hired to take their place.

New

pressures rein-

forced the old ones. Client admissions were again skyrocketing. Staff shortages led to

mostly custodial care and very

little

treatment or therapy.

capacity in 1955 with a combined census of

were

in

As

the system reached

more than 23,000

its

peak

patients, the hospitals

danger of being overwhelmed and imperiled by overcrowding. Influential

formers became increasingly disenchanted with the characteristically custodial

re-

institu-

had become part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
commissioned a study of the human and economic problems that emotionally disabled people faced and agreed to fund demonstration projects
that sought to improve services. This study was conducted by the Joint Commission
on Mental Illness and Health, a nonprofit corporation. Jack Ewalt, then commissioner
of mental health in Massachusetts, served as its executive director. The report, Action
for Mental Health, published in 1961, called for creating community mental health
centers and reducing the size of state hospitals to no more than 1,000 beds. The report
drew from the experiences at Worcester State Hospital with regard to patient reduction
and outpatient and aftercare services. These new ideas were promoted by President
John F. Kennedy, whose legislative initiative was enacted by Congress as the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963. Signing this statute shortly before his assassination. Kennedy declared, "The time has come for a bold new approach." Local services locally administered was identified as the bold new approach. The hope was
that the large state hospitals would become a thing of the past. In 1964 Massachusetts
produced its own report, "Strategies of Mental Health Change," which reiterated the
theme that local care was the wave of the future. That goal was the central thrust of the
tions.

The

hospitals

In February 1955 Congress

ensuing law.
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The System Disassembles
when Republican John Volpe was governor,

In 1966,

Comprehensive

the state legislature passed the

Mental Health and Retardation Act. This landmark legislation, Chapter

735, and subsequent program

stemmed from the idea of creating community mental
domain of still uncharted territory was a pioneering

health centers. Venturing into this

endeavor, for there were virtually no residential care or psychiatric day treatment pro-

was the concept of a service
would receive coordinated services from various human service agencies. Chapter 735 divided the state into seven
grams available

in Massachusetts. Central to this legislation

area, a designated geographical locale in

which

regions and forty area offices, each with

its

ipation through a monitoring role
to the Great Society

programs

was

clients

own

citizens' advisory board. Citizen partic-

a major breakthrough of this adventure, analogous

that called for greater citizen involvement.

In 1967 Governor Volpe appointed Milton Greenblatt, a
tials that satisfied

demands

man

ence, as commissioner of mental health.

A graduate

with impeccable creden-

and administrative experi-

for both professional achievement

of Harvard Medical School,

Greenblatt had previously served as assistant director of the Mass. Mental Health Center

and as superintendent of Boston State Hospital. The task of implementing the new
statute

and

tion" of

setting

all state

up

citizen area boards fell to him.

Soon

to follow

was

trative control of inpatient units. Unitization assigned patients to hospital

their

the "unitiza-

hospitals, a policy designed to give area directors clinical

community of origin.

A shaky

and unpredictable process,

care to a fledgling community-based service system.

Almost simultaneously, the

deinstitutionalization

it

at least

and adminis-

wards by
linked inpatient

37

movement

forced itself on the

nation's agenda and captured public attention. This crusade launched a stinging counter-

attack on the efficacy of state hospitalization,

mental health champions across the country
ties.

which soon became a rallying cry for

in the late sixties

and throughout the seven-

This reform, fueled by federal money, was designed to place patients in community

residences and halfway houses as an alternative to warehousing them in large custodial
institutions.

For

at least

a generation or two, the pressure to deinstitutionalize increased

pace was agonizingly slow in some of
was a social laboratory in which to test this reform, it was Massachusetts, for nowhere else was it advanced so vigorously.
In 1969 lieutenant governor Francis Sargent was thrust into the governor's office
when John Volpe went to Washington to accept the cabinet post of secretary of transportation in the Nixon administration. After Sargent was elected to a full term as governor in 1970, his attention fell on reorganizing the executive branch, creating "super"
agencies, and controlling the bureaucracy by political appointments that reached far
down into the middle ranks of departments and agencies. He named Peter Goldmark
as the first secretary of human services. One of Goldmark's objectives, shared by
Sargent, was to move as many people as possible out of the large human service institutions and into smaller community facilities. Goldmark's strategy relied on forcing
bureaucratic agencies to act by applying pressure from constituency groups at the grass-

in almost all the states in the nation, but the

them. 38

If there

roots level.

While

this

was going

hospital admissions and

amended Chapter 123 in 1970 to clarify
The law's provisions were changed to

on, the state legislature

commitment

policies.

protect the civil liberties of mental patients and to prevent egregious admissions and un-

33

due incarceration.

No

who were deemed

a "danger to themselves and others" could be locked up involuntarily.

Whatever

its

longer could people be committed for mere vagrancy. Only those

merits, the

ter to Greenblatt's

Goldmark

strategy of citizen participation ran directly coun-

philosophy of keeping the physicians on top as well as on

tap. Per-

ceived as a doctor's doctor, Greenblatt did not attempt to close any state hospitals.
Reluctant to adapt to the shifting winds of political change, he maintained the status
quo.

Not

affection

surprisingly, the hospital superintendents, all psychiatrists, loved him, but this

was not shared

universally.

Under

fire

from a

citizens' task force

on children

out of school, Greenblatt stonewalled their efforts to monitor the implementation of

Chapter 750. This law called for the delivery of mental health and educational services

who were most at risk and unable to function within
The children's task force was led by Hubie Jones, a black
worker and community activist who engaged the task force in public advocacy

to emotionally disturbed youngsters

a traditional public school.
social

and confrontational

politics.

After a series of disagreements on programs and policies and a steady drumbeat of
criticism

from

citizen area boards

and other constituency groups, Greenblatt crossed

swords with Jones in a clash that became highly

visible.
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The commissioner was

also

by the Lolas commission, which had investigated the deaths of four
mentally retarded clients at Belchertown. Although an internal probe conducted by
DMH absolved Greenblatt of any negligence in the matter, the Lolas commission found
called to task

him

partially responsible

and therefore called for his resignation. These events led

December 1972.

to

book Managing the State,
Martha Weinberg wrote, "Buffeted by a department that was changing rapidly but in no
single clear direction, by new constituency groups with which he had few natural
ties, and by a superior who wanted to move the department more quickly and in differhis forced departure in

In her aptly titled

ent directions than he did, Greenblatt left his post."
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The search for Greenblatt's successor produced a different atmosphere. Legislation
was passed making the commissioner's appointment coterminous with the governor's
incumbency, a move that was intended to assure greater accountability. To quote
Weinberg again, "Pressure was also building to have a commissioner whose primary
experience and training had been administrative and political rather than medical;

and

in the spring of 1973, as the search

was being conducted,

the General Court abol-

ished the requirement that the commissioner be a board-certified psychiatrist."41

After a six-month search, Governor Sargent appointed William Goldman, a San

Goldman
was impressed by him. While

Francisco psychiatrist, as commissioner of mental health. Sargent had heard

speak

at

a governors conference in Colorado and

Goldman had attended medical school

in Boston, he had spent most of his career in
where he had been director of a community mental health center and a
the national movement to establish more such facilities. Goldman, realizing

California,

leader in
that

Massachusetts was far behind other states in obtaining

brought with him fellow Californian Edward Sarsfield,

its

share of federal funds,

who was

placed in charge of

knew which kind of programs qualified for federal assistance.
Ambitious, energetic, and often abrasive, Goldman was a social change agent extraordinary, and accordingly his actions deeply affected DMH. He set a new tone as
well as a new direction for the department by allowing the citizen area boards to partici-

federal relations. Sarsfield

pate in the budget process and by refusing to curry favor with the medical establish-

ment, which was viewed as a sacred cow. The direct opposite of Greenblatt, he saw
doctors as stubborn resisters of change and impediments to
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new

policies.

Goldman

infu-
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dated them by refusing to fund psychiatric residencies
versity hospitals and clinics;

payroll from working

A complex
didn't

42

at

many of the affiliated uniwho were on the state

he also prohibited psychiatrists

more than

half time at their private practice.

and controversial personality, Goldman knew where he wanted

mind stepping on

sensitive toes

and running roughshod over people

in

go and

to

order to

get there. In a personal interview, he candidly revealed his style and strategy as a public

person.

What

this

department needs

were supposed

to

be doing.

is
I

unambiguous

authority.

can't promise that

who

could give some leadership to people

didn't

Nobody knew what

the hell they

have the right answers, but

I

know where

to turn.

I

at least

wanted

I

to

were going to have some control over the department and
was nothing sacrosanct about the medical community. I don't go in for the
consensus mentality which has dominated this department for years. It's fine if you
don't intend to do anything, but by pursuing a consensus you lose years. It's better
to let everybody know where you stand and to shove yourself and the department out
onto the firing line. Everybody here is desperate to have somebody to follow. That's
the only way to manage this department
by leading it. 43
establish that the citizens
that there

—

Goldman was

the original architect of closing hospitals, and under his leadership

DMH began disassembling the system.

Of the

eleven state hospitals

still

in operation,

was the first to be
shut down, in 1974 Gardner was closed, and in 1975 Foxborough followed suit. These
were the so-called snake pits, but they were hardly the worst. 44 Most of their clients
were transferred to other state hospitals. No money was saved in closing Grafton, but
the state did manage to save $5 million in closing Gardner. These savings were immediately put into community programs, which was no small accomplishment. The first
three were closed within a span of three years. In 1973 Grafton

round of hospital closings broke new ground and paved the way for subsequent

clo-

sures.

As

a result of these events and initiatives, the Massachusetts inpatient population

declined steadily. Between 1960 and 1972 the combined census was dramatically re-

duced from 23,000 to 9,800 patients. At the end of 1975, 4,876 people were in state
mental hospitals. Dependency on these institutions had become the lowest of any east-

As

empty their wards throughout the seventies and early
was reduced to 2,950 by 1984, 23 percent of what it had been
1955. Such a large-scale reduction was spurred by new psychotropic drugs and the

ern

state.

hospitals continued to

eighties, the total figure

in

infusion of federal Medicare and Medicaid funds.

period were elderly patients

who were

changed, and federal intervention was

Many

of those discharged during this

placed in nursing and rest homes. Times had
critical.

This reform set the stage for the events

that followed.

Recalcitrant Institutions Dragged into Court

Michael Dukakis was

first

elected governor in

November 1974. His upset

victory over

incumbent Francis Sargent had been too narrow and the campaign too publicly
sive for

him not

to appoint

men and women

paign Dukakis had attacked Sargent for mishandling the Russell Daniels case.
patient at Belchertown, Daniels

divi-

of substance and ideas. During the cam-

had been convicted and sent

murdering an eighty-three-year-old woman. Advocates argued that
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A former

to Norfolk prison for
his confession

had

been coerced and signed without legal counsel. In another campaign matter, the Massachusetts Psychiatric Association had endorsed Dukakis on the condition that Commis-

Goldman must

was the context

which the governor entered office and
he appointed Lucy Benson as secretary of human services, she refused to meet with Goldman, a Sargent holdover, who had
put together a package of new ideas for her. Soon afterward Goldman was fired, presioner

found a sizable

go. This

fiscal deficit awaiting him.

in

When

sumably for referring publicly to Dukakis's policies as neo-Nazi.
Lee Macht, who had been director of a community mental health center

in

Cam-

was brought in to replace Goldman for a brief stint as interim commissioner.
Picking up where Goldman left off, Macht oversaw the closing of Foxborough State
Hospital, which was accomplished in an orderly and well- structured manner. Robert
Kaplan, the regional administrator, was able to reach an agreement with the public
employee unions that made jobs available to their members at state institutions within
twenty-five miles of Foxborough. This agreement went a long way toward assuring

bridge,

union cooperation.
In 1975 Massachusetts, with the second highest

and the

largest state deficit, faced

its

unemployment

rate in the country

continuing unemployment problem. Confronted

with the difficulties posed by urban minority populations and challenged by well-organized state employee unions, liberal-minded public officials had responded to their
at a level that tax revenues could not support. Many people feared that Massawas becoming a welfare magnet. Social demographics were changing rapidly
as the newest wave of urban immigrants arrived in the state. Blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians had come to the Bay State seeking the same economic opportunities that had
attracted the struggling European immigrants two or three generations earlier.
As people of color, they met with racism and bigotry, but their demands for accommodation were more far-reaching and more expensive than the European immigrants'.
Marching under the banner of civil rights and affirmative action, they demanded decent

demands
chusetts

housing, better jobs, and integrated schools. After nearly a decade of political and
legal battles, reflecting

gation

came

to the

more than a century of stored-up

fears

and antagonisms, desegre-

Boston public schools. The tensions brought to the surface by court-

ordered busing exploded into racial violence in September 1974.

Brought up short by the

deficit

and

inflation,

Dukakis made deep budget cuts and

reduced spending on welfare entitlements and social services.

He

applied a "meat

cleaver" to bring the budget under control. State spending for public higher education

was

greatly reduced.

repercussions.
in

To

urban and then in

effort to

Although economic factors prompted

this action,

it

had

political

the extent that minorities represented a growing political force, first
state politics, they created a countervailing

response to Dukakis's

reduce spending. Political responsiveness to group pressures remained the

norm, but the traditional sources of patronage had not disappeared.
Cross-pressured, the governor incurred the wrath of prominent liberal Democrats
and human service providers, who were clearly estranged. The chasm between them became wide and deep. For purposes of Dukakis's first term, their political support was
critical,

but

it

was

strained to the breaking point.

Barney Frank, a

Democrat,

liberal

openly attacked the governor as a "perfect political ingrate." To add to Dukakis's fiscal

woes, the energy
lic

crisis

and the Arab

oil

embargo

set off a

new scramble

resources, while the previously secure world of state administrators

the third branch of government, the judiciary.

across the state

was

real.
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The

for scarce pub-

was invaded by

threat to mental health

programs
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Advocates began
Mental Health
rights

to stir

to the

movement and

up trouble, using

bar of justice.

A new

legal

means

to bring the

Department of

breed of lawyers, spawned during the

the halcyon days of the Great Society,

came

civil

to fashion compli-

cated remedies intruding on the most detailed practices of state administrators. They

sought to advance the rights of mental patients and
cies in the system.

to disclose the

widespread deficien-

For instance, Frederick Wiseman produced the 1967 documentary

film Titicut Follies, which revealed the horrible conditions at Bridgewater State Hospital

and sent shock waves throughout Massachusetts.

Initially

sealed by the courts,

it

subsequently released, but only after advocates began court proceedings to allow
to

be shown

to the general public.

Even

so, the state

the viewing audience and conditions under

which

it

Supreme

was
it

Judicial Court limited

could be screened. 45

was
mismanagement on

Activists continued to disclose that the Massachusetts mental health system

fraught with abuses, neglect, filthy and unsafe conditions, and

a systemwide scale. Slapped with a class-action lawsuit in 1976, state officials at North-

ampton

State Hospital

were hauled into

court. In the

famous case Brewster

v.

Dukakis,

the plaintiffs charged that they had a legal right to psychiatric treatment in a less
restrictive setting than a state hospital and, conversely, that the state

to provide

such a treatment

setting.

A similar fate befell the

had an obligation

schools for the mentally

retarded at Belchertown, Fernald in Waltham, and Monson, which allowed their clients

These recalcitrant institutions had to be dragged unwillingly into
would do anything to improve the despicable conditions that prevailed. The consent decree was the preferred instrument of judicial intervention. In
effect, the courts became the administrators. The world of mental health practice was
becoming more complex.
After Foxborough was closed, Lee Macht stepped down as commissioner. Dukakis
replaced him with Robert Okin, who was strongly committed to community mental
health services. Only thirty-three years old, Okin had served as commissioner in Vermont from 1973 to 1975. Prior to that, he had been a consultant to the Boston regional
to live in squalor.

court before they

Mental Health. Completely different in style and stratOkin was a dedicated, hard-working, and driven administrator who recognized
that the care of psychiatric patients needed to be further brought into the mainstream.
Psychiatry was still outside the realm of other medicine. Realizing that the system
was broken, Okin declared that his goal was to close all the state hospitals and singlemindedly went about creating such change. No one tested the limits of deinstitutionalization more than he. What Okin understood well, but did not acknowledge, was that
the cities and towns were ill prepared to receive such a massive exodus.
A commissioner with a compelling vision, Okin foresaw the day when mental illness
would be treated not within state hospitals but within private general hospitals. In this
context, he was a true visionary and a forerunner to privatization. For the time being,
however, Okin insisted that community services take precedence over everything else.
As he told one colleague, "I would rather see mental patients eating out of garbage cans
46
in the streets than to see them endure the miserable conditions on the back wards."
Believing that the systemic problems could not be fixed until the hospital function was
placed elsewhere in the mental health delivery system, he was adamant that state employees not be allowed to move into community settings or private group homes.
The commissioner felt that they were trapped in the same institutional mind-set as
office of the National Institute of

egy,

the patients.

As

a zealous reformer obsessed with his vision, Okin pushed vigorously to advance
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the cause, putting intense pressure on the regional administrators to scale
pitals.

Caught

in the middle, they

down

the hos-

were viewed as the enemy by both the hospital super-

intendents and the unions. Here the state missed a rare opportunity on Okin's watch.

DMH could have reached an agreement with the unions but failed to do so. Union officials

were apparently willing

that their

to help the state

members would be assured jobs

table, but the state

never acted on

in an unfortunate standoff.

it.

in

downsize and close

its

hospitals,

provided

group homes. That proposal was on the

This intransigence

at the

bargaining table resulted

47

Metropolitan State Hospital was supposed to be closed in 1978, but that did not happen.

The plan was

for

McLean

Hospital to replace

Met

State in terms of acute

and long-

term care, but the Public Health Council turned down the plan. 48 Meanwhile, the eight
remaining

state hospitals

continued to decline and decay, becoming

little

more than

holding cages for the acutely and chronically insane. All eight were guilty of flagrant
neglect and

harm

to nearly helpless people.

The back wards were

filthy

and appallingly

inhumane. Patients were not only stripped of their self-esteem and human dignity, but
the restive and unruly ones

some forced

to take

were forcibly placed

medication against their

in seclusion

will.

Grim

sexual abuse abounded. Hospital attendants often played
threatening to send

them

and mechanical

stories

restraints,

about physical and

mind games with

patients

to Bridgewater with the criminally insane if they acted

by

up

or otherwise caused trouble. Since the law called for strict security, this kind of intimi-

dation and cruelty

was no

As Dukakis came

idle threat.

to the

end of

his first

term in 1978, he was unable

to patch

up the

differences and bitter feelings that split the Democratic Party into warring factions.

Seizing the opportunity to take advantage of the

Edward King, a conservative

split in the

ranks of the Democrats,

Democrat and former director of the Massachusetts
Port Authority, challenged Dukakis in a party primary. By appealing to disaffected
Democrats, King scored a stunning upset victory and went on to win the governorship
Irish

in the general election.

A few

weeks

later, in

December

1978, the state and the plaintiffs,

who had been

engaged in the Brewster case for the past two years, entered into what became known
as the Northampton consent decree. It mandated that "clients were entitled to live in
the least restrictive,

most normal

residential alternatives

and

to receive appropriate

treatment, training, and support suited to their individual needs."

Some

Okin's prospects.

49

This decree buoyed

colleagues suspected Okin of playing a double-agent role in

aiding and abetting this litigation. In truth, he supported the consent decree.

Governor King reappointed Okin as commissioner on February 5, 1979. Measured
by federal standards, Northampton was not the worst mental hospital. That dubious
distinction belonged to Boston State Hospital, which housed 3,600 patients as late as
1964, when it was considered a disaster. The hospital was slated to be closed in 1975.
In fact,

some 100

geriatric patients

were transferred

to

Lemuel Shattuck Public Health

Hospital in 1976. But this phasedown proved to be politically sensitive and unacceptable to the community, so

Okin was forced

to

back

off.

He

subsequently accelerated the

pace of deinstitutionalization. In March 1981 the average daily census

had dwindled

to

147 patients, and, after

its

at

Boston State

142 years of operation, Gerard O'Connor,

its

superintendent, closed this venerable institution.

At

this

juncture Okin

cisco General Hospital.

left

By

DMH to accept a job as chief of psychiatry at San Fran-

this

time he had become too expensive for the King admin-
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which was not committed

istration,

to a vision

of community services.

Among

his

go to the legislature to get the money he needed.
Upset by the budgetary implications, King no longer desired to keep such an independent commissioner. Okin had obviously worn out his welcome.

many

talents,

On April

Okin had the

ability to

Mark

1981, King appointed

7,

Mills to

fill

who had

the vacancy. Mills,

served as chief executive of the Mass. Mental Health Center, took the job as a steppingstone. Before his last position, he

had been chief resident

Administration Hospital in Palo Alto.

He

in

psychiatry

at the

held a law degree from Harvard

and a medical degree from Stanford University, an educational background

ped him

to

handle his new job, but during his two-year tenure few

sistic to

any significant

into policy.

sonnel working part time in community clinics. The state Ethics
that

if

School

that equip-

Some colleagues viewed Mills as being too narcisaccomplish much of anything. He defended the practice of DMH clinical per-

were transformed

ideas

Veterans

Law

Commission had

ruled

such a practice was in violation of the conflict-of-interest laws. 50

December 1979 Okin had appointed

In

a blue-ribbon commission to examine the

of Massachusetts mental health services and project what lay ahead. After seven-

state

teen months of studying the vexing problem, this group released

Health Crossroads" in
sion set out

May

1981, a month after Mills had

suggestions as to the

its

like prophecies.

way

forward.

Some

come

its

report "Mental

aboard.

The commis-

of the lines in this report read

Echoing Okin's sentiments, the commission recommended closing

good reason. 51
The Department of Mental Health was then engaged in political battles over funding
on Beacon Hill. The beleaguered department came under increasing attack as the largest
and most poorly managed state agency. By his own admission, Mills publicly acknowledged in 1981 that no one knew exactly how many employees the department had on its
payroll. Management weaknesses were glaring. As a complacent bureaucracy, DMH
all state

hospitals, but nothing

came of its

report, for

lacked standards of accountability as well as standards for assuring quality care. There

were few
poor

if

any incentives for personnel to perform well. The department suffered from

staff recruitment

and training as well as the

workable programs. Along with

this

inability to transform

new

complacency came an unwillingness

to

ideas into

admit

mistakes and take corrective action. All these signs were indicative of a public agency
that

had

lost its

supposed

sense of mission, confused

its priorities,

and forgotten the public

it

was

to serve.

DMH

Clearly,
was an agency in continual disarray and turmoil. Its administrators
were taking a beating not only from legislators, but also from advocates and unions,
which became obstreperous and obstructive.
was beset on all sides. Proposition
2V2, which limited local taxation, was causing problems in public finance at the munici-

DMH

The

pal level.

politicians

on Beacon Hill were taking public money away from

agencies in order to finance local aid. Between 1981 and 1982
tions.

DMH lost

During the remainder of the King administration, the agency behaved

serving and protective ways. Hunkering

down

to a siege mentality,

it

state

1,200 posiin self-

stonewalled not

only advocates but also compliance with the court-ordered consent decrees.

Amid
strike in

the swirl of this turbulence, employees at several state hospitals

1982 to protest

situation,

hospitals.

their

went out on

low pay and poor working conditions. Faced with a

crisis

Governor King mobilized the National Guard and sent state troops to run the
In the fall of 1982 King turned out to be a one-term leader
Dukakis defeat-

—

ed King in a much heralded intraparty rematch and recaptured the governorship.
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What Went Wrong?
Anticipating the consequences of any policy

is

always

difficult at best

not easily translated into policy. Policymakers usually land in trouble

— new ideas

if

are

they do not por-

problem and the options for its resoluwhat happened in Massachusetts. Moreover, the reformers seriously underestimated the economic and political power needed to close hospitals like
Northampton and Boston State. 52
Without going into the horrors of what one finds inside the walls of a state hospital,
tray reality or identify correctly the attributes of a
tion. In essence, this is

suffice

it

to say that

it is

not a pretty picture. Only those

who have endured

such experi-

ences or seen what goes on can describe the reality of such an institution. The cruel

and

sadistic treatment therein

One Flew over

was

vividly portrayed in

the Cuckoo's Nest. Unitization

abuses, but they

still

Ken Kesey's book and movie

was supposed

to

have corrected these

persisted. Despite the similarity of all mental hospital experiences

each carries

in their broadest outlines,

its

own

daily agonies with occasional small

tri-

umphs.
Displeasure with the mental health system was widespread at the end of the seventies.

The

more persistent.
Rae O'Leary, who had spent most of their careers in state hospicrisis management. O'Leary's experience was typical for many,

recurring public outcry for better treatment grew louder and

Administrators such as
tals,

were

thrust into

who ended up

frustrated

were so horrible

and angry. O'Leary expressed her anger by saying, "Conditions

in these hellholes that they should

have been blown up." 53 Barbara

Hoffman, who began her career as a hospital attendant

at

Met

State in 1956,

was some-

what more philosophical. Interviewed by Okin for the job of regional administrator in
54
1978, she told him, "I hope to see daisies growing on the hill where Met State stood."
When she ended that career in 1986, Hoffman had seen eleven commissioners come and
go, but

Met

remained standing. The average tenure for a mental health commis-

State

sioner nationwide

was eighteen months.

After years of neglect, the aging infrastructure

at

Danvers State Hospital was crum-

condemned and were no longer
reporter, as "a monument to
society's neglect of the mentally ill." 55 Much the same could be said for the rest of them,
which symbolized the politics of evasion and the decaying status quo. To record the

bling.

Although most of

its

older buildings had been

in use, the hospital stood, in the

words of one newspaper

had outlived their usecommonwealth. Bad and ragged as it was, the system
was better than nothing. At rock bottom the state hospitals provided support of last
resort for the indigent mentally ill
there was no place else for them to go. This conundrum, which lay at the heart of the policy paradox, explains in large measure why
Dukakis did not try very hard to close them.
substantial decline of these institutions is not to suggest that they

fulness or that disaster befell the

—

Deinstitutionalization

bound

may have

to backfire, for the

been a sound concept, but

consequences of

its

it

was a policy almost
life were

implementation on community

not anticipated. Because of poor planning and inadequate funding, the Department of

Mental Health lacked the necessary resources to handle such a wholesale discharge
of patients.

It

presented the classic dilemma between need and capability.

As a conse-

quence, the policy was implemented untested and irresponsibly. Most patients were
literally

dumped

into the streets,

where they roamed hungry and ragged and slipped

through the cracks in the system. Without the necessary community infrastructure,
the reform

was doomed

to failure. Small

wonder

and ambiguity. 56
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that the policy resulted in chaos
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Left to fend for themselves, the ex-patients were too disoriented and too confused
to

make

their

way through

the

For the most part they tended

maze of public bureaucracies
to cluster in

estimated 1,500 and 3,600 mentally

Some found

ended up homeless.

ill

to get the help they

urban centers where,

persons

in

— no one knew

lodging in local

jails, in

homeless shelters

wound up back

like the

—

the exact figure

general hospital emergency

rooms, and in rundown tenements and shabby rooming houses. Others slept
store entrances or in

needed.

Massachusetts, an

Pine Street Inn in Boston.

in street

Still

others

Under these circumstances, the
result
was
bound
disappointing.
To
this
day
Robert
Okin firmly believes that
end
to be
deinstitutionalization did not fail. On the contrary, he contends that it was never given a
real chance to succeed. Okin's argument may find favor in academic circles, but not in
door of

in the revolving

state hospitals.

government. 57

Some programs

survived to prove themselves in the eighties, but the Reagan ad-

ministration used block grants mainly to

combat drug abuse. The federal government

continued to provide planning grants to states for community mental health services but

abandoned direct funding of

virtually

mental health centers operating in
psychiatric day

waiting

lists

services.

By 1983

there

were only ten community

of Massachusetts. Most areas of the state had

all

and residential programs, but these were always

filled to capacity

residential sitings.

the problems of the mentally impaired but insisted that the solution should he

where
as the

else, not in their

who

homeless shelters to provide for those

patients

streets.

While some general

left it to

resisted conventional treatment

hospitals

had psychiatric

units,

known

the

and wan-

only voluntary

were admitted.

Once More

into the

At the beginning of
Carballo as

human

Breach

his

second term as governor, Michael Dukakis appointed Manuel

services secretary. Severely criticized in his

first

repeat that

term for not ap-

who had made a campaign contribution, Dukakis was not
mistake. Carballo, who had unimpeded access to the governor,

pointing people

searching for a replacement for

Mark

Mills.

February 1983 Carballo told the press,
that has lost a sense of direction

Seven people, not one of
tion.

some-

neighborhoods. These frequently voiced protests became

NIMBY — not in my backyard — syndrome. By default, DMH

dered the

with

Community opposition was a major obstacle to supported
Residents, who were eager to maintain property values, recognized

for admission.

As Miles Shore,

about to
started

Both he and Dukakis wanted a manager. In

"We need someone

able to

manage an agency

and has been subject to a great deal of criticism." 58

whom was

a physician, were under consideration for the posi-

a psychiatrist at the Mass. Mental Health Center, wryly observed,

"The commissioner should have

real experience in public administration to rebuild the

department. To have someone identified with program development would send the

wrong message for these times."59
Five months later Dukakis had decided that James Callahan met the requirements
and appointed him to the post in May 1983. Callahan, the first nonpsychiatrist to hold
the position, was a capable and articulate administrator. He had previously managed two
public health facilities, Lemuel Shattuck Hospital in Jamaica Plain and the Massachusetts Hospital School in Canton and served as secretary of elder affairs in the first Dukakis administration. The governor, along with his top aides, distrusted the department
as an inept and clumsy bureaucracy, considering it weak and ineffectual. He suggested
that Callahan might want to clean house.
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On November

women and

four

10, 1983, in

an effort to shake up the agency, Callahan fired three as-

commissioners and seven regional administrators. This famous incident involving

sistant

men became known

six

bloody Thursday. Robert

as

Porter, the chief

operating officer, gave the dismissal order, which no one had anticipated, for

shrouded in utmost secrecy in a department
old and bringing in

new

known

for

its

By

leaks.

blood, Callahan could start with a fresh

it

was

clearing out the

slate.

60

were unfairly scapegoated. They saw their
from the strains of the system, when in fact,
after a decade of huge expenditures, the Dukakis regime refused to pour any more
money into deinstitutionalization. 61 Ironically, two of those dismissed went on to become
mental health commissioners in other states. Donna Mauch, who had served as assistant
commissioner from 1981 to 1983, became commissioner in Rhode Island, and Michael
Hogan, following a similar route, became commissioner first in Connecticut and subseInsiders felt that the ten administrators

firings as a ploy to divert public attention

quently in Ohio.

A few
Okin

weeks

after this incident, the state

that patients

committed

treatment with mind-altering drugs, or
selves, to

half of

if

Judicial Court ruled in

it

six other patients at

was a landmark

battle that

Boston State Hospital. Originally

had gone

all

the

way from

Boston to the First Circuit Court of Appeals and then
where it was remanded for state adjudication.
Justice

v.

not mentally competent to speak for them-

filed

the federal district court

to the U.S.

in

who

Rogers

have a fundamental right to refuse

have a judge make that decision for them. The case had been brought on be-

Ruby Rogers and

in 1975,

Supreme

to mental hospitals

Supreme Court,

Ruth Abrams, who wrote the unanimous decision, declared: "The doctors

are attempting to treat as well as maintain order in the hospital have interests in

conflict with those of their patients

who may wish

to avoid medication."

62

Psychiatrists

attacked the decision as an unwarranted intrusion by the courts into medical decision

making that would render access to treatment more difficult for the most seriously ill.
Advocacy groups were delighted with the court ruling because it gave patients a choice.
A series of unhappy events combined to dramatize the housing problem that former
patients faced in Massachusetts. Sadly, tragedy struck three times within a relatively

short time. In June 1981,

Cookie Wilson, a mentally

ill

woman, died

as fire engulfed

an abandoned town house in Boston where she was spending the night.

house

fires,

one

in

Worcester on April

19, 1983,

and the other

in

Two rooming

Beverly on July

4,

1984, claimed the lives of fourteen clients. These tragedies sparked a legislative investigation and focused media attention on their plight. 63

The ensuing

publicity raised the

level of public awareness.

So the pressure

built within the

Dukakis administration, and with notable public sup-

port and debate, to improve the mental health system.
late

When Manny

Carballo died in

January 1984, Dukakis appointed Philip Johnston to replace him as

secretary.

A liberal and compassionate Democrat, Johnston was

who had once worked

as a hospital attendant at

"one big hole

al

stake in the issue, since both their families

felt that

Northampton.

services

He saw

mental health

needed to be reformed." 64 Dukakis and Johnston each had a person-

as

that

human

a former state legislator

had been touched by mental illness. Both
far. They saw the possibility of

the policy of deinstitutionalization had gone too

midcourse corrections and changes in Dukakis's second term, but before they could do
anything, they first had to organize for political action.
In August 1985

Edward Murphy was brought over from
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who

Services to replace Commissioner Callahan,
Brandeis. Although

Murphy came from

returned to his academic duties

at

a criminal justice background, he had a reputa-

tion as a strong manager. Before leaving office, Callahan

warned against any move

toward reestablishing large hospitals to warehouse people.

Consensus on the future direction of mental health was hard
Johnston's perspective, a war had been

waged

pour more money into hospitals or to put
dence of mental

illness,

into

it

community

From

be necessary to solve the problem. This number, in

his

Based on the incibeds would

services.

know how many

Johnston wanted to

to achieve.

for the past twenty years over whether to

state hospital

judgment, had

be defensible.

to

The scale of the problem he had identified and probed clearly required 2,150 beds. 65
Not coincidentally, policy control remained securely in the governor's office.
Catherine Dunham, the executive director of the Massachusetts Council of Human Services Providers, was brought in to replace Johnston as Dukakis's human services policy
adviser. Having started her career as a teacher in a reform school, she was pro-deinstitutionalization and highly regarded by service providers. Dunham was expected to build
bridges with the provider community.

Amid

this flurry

of activity, Jean Dietz of the

element of power
by these personnel assignments.
By 1985 the Dukakis administration was committed to a gubernatorial message on
mental health reform. It began with an initiative known as the Mental Health Action
Project, which brought together a broad coalition of policy advocates. A covey of med-

Boston Globe and other media observers had failed

to note the critical

signified

ical experts,

departmental specialists, and constituency group leaders appeared on

steering committee.

from a

It

was an impressive working group whose

variety of perspectives

for the Mentally

111,

and

posts. Anita Pyatt,

thirteen

who headed

its

members came

the state Alliance

took a lead position. She persuaded the steering committee to

endorse the idea of using vacant state land for establishing therapeutic communities and
assisted housing for the mentally

and

alleviate the

ill.

This would enable them to live independently

burden of aging parents faced with having

to care for them. After

much

debate on the efficacy of the programs of the seventies, a consensus emerged in shaping
the policy agenda.

The technique yielded a

written

document

as a departure point for

subsequent discussions with the governor. 66

Major improvements were to be made at the seven state hospitals. The goal of DMH
was to bring them up to the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations for purposes of approval. Metropolitan, Taunton, Worcester,

and Westborough were targeted

to

become

regional specialized care facilities that

would

provide long-term inpatient and quarter-way residential services for clients with a variety of clinical needs.

A battery of suggestions emerged from the meetings of the

committee. Essentially, their work resulted in three major policy proposals:
outlay program; (2) a quadrupling of housing units; and (3) a package of
living
late

and treatment options. They submitted

November

their

recommendations

(1)

steering

a capital

community

to the

governor in

1985. 67

in western Massachusetts on December 19 and then flew by helicopter
where he delivered his special message, a propitious event in terms of
both timing and location. The governor called for a five-year plan designed to renovate
and refurbish the existing hospitals and to overhaul the outpatient care system. He saw
the problem as one that had been deteriorating for decades and was sure to become
worse if ignored. Only a massive infusion of money and new construction would

Dukakis was

to

Met

State,
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suffice.

With a soul-searching review of successes and

We

are painfully aware the system of care envisioned in 1966

oped.

Many

areas of the

Commonwealth

little

support

is

is

Dukakis declared:
not yet fully devel-

lack emergency screening and crisis services;

housing opportunities for chronically mentally

and

failures,

ill

persons remain extremely limited;

provided for families caring for mentally

ill

relatives. Hospital care

many

for those needing acute or long-term psychiatric treatment does not in

even marginally acceptable standards.
homeless mentally

We

are all well

cases meet

aware of the tragic plight of

68

ill.

Dukakis's speech, so typical of him, was objective, detached, and measured and
clearly the result of long reflection.

It

boosted the morale of those

who

labored anony-

mously in the field of mental health. The governor bestowed on them the public recognition and appreciation that was long overdue. George Sigel, the medical director at Met
State, who had served on the steering committee, was more than pleased. His reaction
could be noted in the press. "We are overcrowded and operating at two-thirds of the
staff we need. The hospitals have been neglected. This is the first expression the work
we do is of value there has been in years." 69
Dukakis was then riding the crest of his power and popularity in Massachusetts. In
1986 he was easily reelected to a third term as governor with an overwhelming majority.
He had the best of both worlds. With a prosperous state economy, there was plenty of

money to go around and no reason to rock the
made him more accessible to group pressures.
hospital

was developed during 1986 and

For instance, the boilers and

oil

pumps

boat. Presidential ambitions

the first phase of

at

Met

may have

In any event, a master plan for each state

improvements actually began.

State were replaced.

provements were to be completed over the next five

Systemwide im-

to seven years. In order to expedite

the planning and design review process for hospital renovations and

new

construction,

was obtained.
prevented Dukakis from delivering on the

a waiver of the determination of need certification

But financial and

political constraints

ommendations. Three factors doomed

his revitalization efforts. First,

rec-

wrangling over

the proposed plan of state representative Angelo Scaccia to redevelop Boston State Hospital hurt badly.

Chapter 579, which mandated the process for disposition of surplus

from the communities
which the vacant land was located. In this case, the citizens' advisory committee
got bogged down in petty squabbles and could not put its act together. Second, legislative inertia caused considerable delay and inaction. Stalled for two years in the General
Court, the $340-million capital appropriation was not passed until the spring of 1987.
Third, and by far the most crippling blow, the state economy suddenly went from boom

property, required the participation of local officials and citizens
in

to bust.

In 1987,

when

the state

economy was

still

booming, Dukakis decided

president largely on the strength of the Massachusetts "miracle."

to run for

The governor not only

campaign in November 1988, but George Bush's attacks
damaged his reputation as an efficient manager. Then the climate changed
as the state's inflated economy began faltering. Tax revenues fell well below projections. Hard pressed for resources, the state raised taxes and cut services. Johnston was
forced to make budget cuts totaling $1 billion and to eliminate 5,000 human services
positions from a base of 30,000 jobs. Bowing to reality, the governor abandoned the
struggle. As Johnston recalled, "We were barely under way when the bottom dropped
out of the Massachusetts economy and our project was stopped in its tracks." 70
lost his ill-fated presidential

on

his record
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Despite his public pronouncements, Dukakis was unable to deliver. Curiously, the
services community did not attack him the way it had done during his first term
was no time for recriminations. Motivated by a desire to cast himself in a favorable light, Dukakis was eager to maintain a liberal image in his search for higher

human

—

this

public office. Disagreements and disappointments were papered over in the interests of

The truth is
more hospitals.

party politics.

close any

governor nor family members wanted to

that neither the

Although a cadre of distinguished people was actively involved

came

administration, ideologues

to the fore in policy matters. In

in the

May

Dukakis

1988, at the height

of the presidential primaries, the Department of Mental Health joined forces with the
111 in promoting an antistigma campaign. As its central
campaign sought to prevent the need for isolating mental patients from
the community, an issue on which the governor and the antistigma ideologues parted
company. The latter viewed him as trying to rebuild the institutional settings that had

state

Alliance for the Mentally

theme,

this

created the problem in the
Project, the
apart.

policy

first

place. After the failure of the Mental Health Action

promising coalition of citizens, politicians, administrators, and experts broke

The steering committee dissolved and
was negligible.

the impact of

its

ideas on mental health

The History of Metropolitan State Hospital before Closure

Now

let

us turn to a brief chronicled history of Metropolitan State Hospital. In 1927,

two years before the Great Depression began,
tine

state officials

purchased 378 acres of

farmland in the western suburbs of Boston. This property, then valued

intersected the municipal

boundary

lines of

Belmont, Lexington, and Waltham when

these suburbs were quiet farming communities.
hills,

woods, and streams. Stone walls

that

remain with their symmetry and beauty.
the boondocks.

It

at

The

rural landscape contained rolling

once formed boundaries between farms

was

Under construction from 1927

took eight years to build

pris-

568,922,

at

typical

New

to 1935, the sprawling hospital

a cost of $1.8 million.

Some

still

England countryside out

of the

was done by the Works Progress Administration. At the time
modern mental health facility in the nation.

it

in

complex

work in the later stages
was considered the most

Groundbreaking for the administration building took place on December 27, 1927.

Two

years later, on December 26, 1929, the first
from Grafton State Hospital to Met State, whose

October 29, 1930.

Among

the dignitaries

thirty-six patients
official

on hand for

were transferred

opening was celebrated on

this

occasion were acting superin-

tendent Clifford Moore, Governor Frank Allen, and former Governor Alvan T. Fuller,
the latter

two governors

stalwart Republicans. This

was a

transition year that

marked

and the coming of the New Deal in Massachusetts.
Democrat Joseph Ely was elected governor in 1930. Yankee hegemony was beginning
to give way to the Irish political ascendancy, though the Republicans still dominated
the state legislature. Irish Democrats like James Michael Curley and Charles Hurley

the end of the old political order

soon followed Ely into the governor's

The

office.

original group of seventeen buildings that

dome

comprised Met State included the

was not
and cafeteria building where food was prepared and
served; the continuous treatment group (CTG) building for patients; and two large em-

medical-surgical building with

completed

its

top and six patient living areas, which

until 1935; the service
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ployee dormitories. The heating plant, originally fueled by coal, was later converted to
fuel

oil.

An

elaborate system of underground tunnels, which ran beneath

all

these build-

from one building to another
during inclement weather and to transport food the same way. The Furcolo building,
named for the deceased wife of a sitting governor, was added in 1957. There were two
employees

ings, carried the steam lines, enabling

single-sex admission wards,

were

one

for

women and

to travel

the other for men. Chronic patients

back wards. Met State was a hospital within a hospital, treating patients

sent to the

with both mental health and general health care.

The massive

CTG building

provided eight wings of patient accommodations connect-

ed by a continuous circular corridor. Each wing had three wards, a
used for

total

of twenty-four,

At the center of the complex was a secure courtyard,
recreational purposes, whose orientation provided significant advantages to

which were

lettered alphabetically.

the patients and staff with controlled access to

all

parts of the facility.

The

individual

wings afforded each ward a secure open porch area with a southern exposure for maxi-

mum

sunlight and fresh

This

new

air.

enterprise started well.

1,248 beds, admitted

some 1,182

The

hospital, designed for a physical capacity of

They were

patients in 1931.

to require a

minimum

of staff supervision and were expected to participate in work programs such as agriculture, laundry,

and hospital

industries.

Some 45

with 1,315 patients.

By 1932 Met

acres of land

State already exceeded its capacity
were under cultivation as part of its working

farms, which continued to operate until the late 1960s. 71 In the depression-ridden thirthe hospital

ties,

ular employees,

no

was

who

partially staffed with

direct public transportation

some kind of bus

obtain

was

working patients from other

had to get

lived off campus,

to

and from work on

hospitals.

Reg-

own

since

their

available. Hospital administrators tried for years to

no

service, but to

avail.

Several hospitals were located in the immediate vicinity. Nearby were both the

Fernald School for the mentally retarded and the Middlesex County Hospital, the

latter

McLean Hospital in Belmont was a
Met State campus was the Gaebler Chil-

established in 1930 as a tuberculosis sanitarium.
short distance

down

the road. Adjacent to the

dren's Center, a sixty-bed facility built in 1952.

disturbed children from across the

state.

It

accepted referrals of emotionally

In 1984 Dukakis signed an executive order pro-

hibiting the placement of citizens under the age of nine in adult mental hospitals. Al-

though Gaebler was a separate

entity,

it

shared

keeping crew, and engineering and electrical

On

Met

State's laundry,

pharmacy, ground-

staff.

Met State grounds, one could not help but notice the name of WilMcLaughlin inscribed in bold letters above the white portico of the main administration building. Dr. McLaughlin, who served as its dedicated superintendent from
1952 until 1974, was by all accounts an all-powerful father figure and highly respected
physician whose entire professional life was wrapped up in Met State. A kind, gentle,
and dignified person, McLaughlin lived on the grounds and cared deeply for the people
in his charge. Conciliatory by nature, he was not a fighter. He accepted his lot and rarely
clamored for more funds or complained but did the job with the resources at hand. He
liam

left

entering the

F.

the day-to-day

O'Leary with

management of the

whom

hospital to his administrative assistant Paul

he operated as a team. Afflicted with poor eyesight, McLaughlin

used a magnifying glass for reading. Whatever his shortcomings as a superintendent,
he inspired people to accomplish what they otherwise would not have done. Beloved by
his staff, he was the last of a vanishing breed of superintendents who attended to patients

and made

reached

its

their

rounds on the hospital wards. The patient population

peak of 2,200 during

his tenure.
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at

Met

State
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sured a steady flow of federal funds, but state
it

Com-

helm, McLaughlin succeeded in maintaining the hospital's Joint

at the

mission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations

money

f JCAHO)

accreditation,

gradually diminished,

which

as-

much of

reallocated by the central office to other hospitals. With tight budgets, state funds

slowed

to a trickle, forcing

deferment of physical maintenance. This inevitably produced

deteriorating conditions, a long-term difficulty. Personnel, with

was always a major problem. According

Jack MacDougall,

to

its

high rate of turnover,

who

served as personnel

from the normal standard of 1.3
72
each
patient
to
.3
staff
per
patient
during
the
Dukakis
years. Staff shortages
staff for
necessitated the use of prison inmates from nearby Concord, who were transported to
and from the hospital on a work release program, for general duty.
director

from 1971

Although McLaughlin did not

down

had

to 1989, staffing levels

officially retire until

as superintendent four years earlier.

administrators with various

titles:

fallen

He was

September 1978, he had stepped

followed by a succession of ten

Arnold Abrams, Ernest Cook, Barbara Hoffman,

Melvin Tapper, Frank Karlon, Katherine Olberg, and Phyllis Oram. Audrey DeLoffi,
who took over in December 1985 and was given the new title of chief operating officer,

was succeeded by Fernando Durand and Marylou Sudders. Nothing

better illustrates

the managerial turnover problem than this line of succession from 1974 to 1992.

There was a pattern of incompetence and poor management. Met State

JCAHO

accreditation in 1980, and

physical plant

was

in

from then on

it

was

By

downhill.

all

bad shape, incrementalism had taken

its toll,

lost its

this

time the

and patients com-

plained about poor heating, poor ventilation, lack of air conditioning, foul odors, and
filthy conditions.

The aging

Only three of the seventeen

original structures

still

housed

patients.

buildings were falling apart: crumbling bricks, leaking roofs, and a wasteful

heating system characterized their physical deterioration. In August 1983 the hospital

was forced

to operate

without running water for two days, a debacle that occurred

a fifty-five-year-old water

had

to

pump broke and

caused the water tower to run

dry.

73

when

Water

be trucked in by mobile units of the National Guard.

Since the old steam lines had few operable control valves,

much

vacant space in

the abandoned buildings remained heated, resulting in huge energy losses. Other

mechanical, electrical, and emergency systems were outdated and inefficient.
estimated that the hospital wasted about three-quarters of

It

was

annual $1.7-million

its

heating budget.
Citizens

who

sat

on the Cambridge area board were outraged by such waste, for

they took their citizens' monitoring role seriously. While observing patients huddled
together in dilapidated wards and dingy day rooms, board chairman Bruce

Houghton
end

told a group of visiting state legislators in April 1984, "These people are at the

of the

line, the last to

violent. Others

be deinstitutionalized, the

have no place

else to go. If

last to get

other services.

Some

are

any were covered by medical insurance,

they wouldn't be here. But no one questions whether they are better off here than as
victims of the street." 74

Many

other illustrations of

cited, but a

Met

few more examples

State's dilapidated

will suffice.

The

and rundown condition could be

superstructure supporting the

roof of the Furcolo building had rotted to the point where

it

was deemed

wooden

structurally

unsound; engineers feared the roof might collapse with a heavy snowstorm; the elevators frequently failed to

work, which meant that physically disabled patients had to

be carried up- and downstairs during

fire drills; the electrical

wiring and lighting were

wholly inadequate; spare parts were hard to obtain; and water faucets had to be removed

from one building

to repair those in another.
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Virtually no aspect of the operation was functioning at acceptable federal standards.
Most experts agreed that the cost of restoring Met State to meet these requirements
was prohibitively expensive. Even executive office health and human services secretary

Philip Johnston admitted as

much. In April 1989 the Division of Capital Planning

and Operations hired an engineering consulting firm to study the problem. The engineers estimated the restoration cost at $38.8 million.

Some

73

sixty-six acres of the hospital property adjoined the

an area that had been designated as a protected wetland.

Beaverbrook reservation,

When

a fuel oil spill near

by the Department of Environmental Protection,
it had cost the state $30,000 to clean up this hazardous waste. There was also a paupers
cemetery where some 300 deceased patients from Met State and the Fernald School
had been buried. Instead of traditional headstones, their graves were marked with small
concrete blocks that identified them by patient number and religious preference, but
client names were kept on file with their numbers. Many towns and cities openly resisted the siting of housing for the mentally ill, but Waltham, which had repeatedly demonstrated its support for the hospital and its clients, was an exception. While local town
the boiler building had been detected

and hospital relations were relatively good, the three surrounding municipalities hardly
communicated with one another. The typically narrow perspective of local governments
found them preoccupied with their own problems and conflicts over zoning and land
use issues.

Met

State

Rocked by Scandal

What goes on

inside a state mental hospital

is

typically a mystery to the public

and

draw attention to it, usually when a dangerous patient escapes or when a scandal breaks. Such incidents usually prompt an investigation and sensational media coverage. A major scandal occurred at Met State in
February 1990, when four male employees
a security guard, a mental health worker,
were charged with having sexually abused
a nursing supervisor, and a plumber
five female patients. This sordid affair reached into a fairly high level of management,
and the story was widely reported in the local press. 76
elected officials alike until dramatic events

—

DMH conducted

Initially,

County

district attorney,

then

its

own

made

and

who knew

all

were

internal probe. Scott Harshbarger, the

were held, the four

state

employees were found

fired for cause. In addition, thirty-one other hospital

employees

about the incidents were reprimanded for having failed to report the sexual

misconduct, which they were required to do by law. Under

Audrey DeLoffi resigned
Duran,

Middlesex

a separate investigation. Charges were filed against

the accused, administrative hearings
guilty,

—

who

as chief operating officer.

fire to

clean up the mess,

She was replaced by Fernando

took charge for a brief period, staying long enough to sign the disciplinary

actions.

Marylou Sudders, who had been recruited by

assistant

commissioner Katherine

Olberg, replaced Duran. Sudders was a social worker and the area director for central

Middlesex County. Interestingly enough, although she had never worked in a state
mental hospital, Sudders was brought in to close Met State. 77 Her more immediate

was to improve the patient environment, and she moved vigorously in the
months to meet this goal.
Adept with people, Sudders proved herself an able administrator. She realized that

objective
first

the repercussions of the sex scandal had seriously

48

damaged

staff morale.

Most em-

New England Journal

ployees

felt
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they were victims of guilt by association. Working in an atmosphere of

suspicion and intimidation, they

all felt tainted.

As

she struggled to take the initiative,

Sudders decided to address the problem head on, her goal being to change the culture.

On November 30

memo

detailing her position in terms

way of improving

patient care, upholding patient

she sent the staff an

of what she expected of them by

initial

78

Whatever the inspiration, Sudders's statement
allayed the fears of some, but the issue would not go away. Many employees still
believed their thirty-one coworkers had taken a bad rap.
and protecting patient

dignity,

rights.

The Transition Team Develops a Plan

When

the fiscal crisis broke in October 1990,

Murphy

his organization faced.

Because of sharp reductions

$10-million deficiency in the

way

to

Henry Tomes, who had succeeded Edward
problem

as mental health commissioner, realized that he had to solve a specific

recoup

this

Met

revenue shortfall was

Rae O'Leary, the Metro West area
deficiency, expecting her

out a plan later

in state funding, he discovered a

Tomes decided

State operating budget.
to

downsize the

director, to devise a plan to

answer within an hour. Agreeing

that evening

at

He

hospital.

to

that the

only

therefore asked

compensate for the

do

it,

O'Leary mapped

home. 79

The major responsibility for this downsizing initiative rested with the Metro West
area. In September 1990 a total of 827 employees worked at Met State, approximately
475 of whom were direct care staff (415 nursing personnel and 60 clinicians). Of the
total full-time equivalents, 53 percent were minorities, mostly Haitians, who worked in
food service and housekeeping. As the newest wave of urban immigrants, they were
the only people who would accept such low-paying, menial jobs, and they experienced
various cultural barriers. Since the Haitians were assigned entry-level positions, they

ranked low in seniority and

civil service status

and

their

bumping

rights

were affected

accordingly.

A veteran

of the Foxborough State Hospital closing in 1975, Rae O'Leary was a

career psychiatric nurse
tal

Health.

who had climbed

through the ranks

A tough bureaucratic infighter,

that anything could

be done

if

managed

she not only

in the

knew

Department of Men-

the territory but believed

correctly. In her view, the client

always came

O'Leary detailed the specifics of her plan in a public document and identified a set
of key functional areas that needed to be addressed. These included the clinical process,

first.

human
perty,

had

to

resources, labor relations, legal issues, communications, physical plant and pro-

and administrative operations. O'Leary
be developed before any

felt that

client transfers

ment terms, she analyzed the problem

a specific

work plan

for each area

could be made. In budget and manage-

as follows:

The budget reduction which would occur January 1, 1991, resulted in die ability to
fund only 439 staff, a reduction of 288 [full-time employees]. This, in turn, defined the
number of clients who could be cared for at the facility. With an overall staff to patient
ratio of 2 to 1, a marginally acceptable level, 220 clients could be cared for by a staff
of 439. Therefore, the census would need to decrease from 400 to 220, a reduction of
180, during the nine-month period

between October 1990 and June 1991. 80

For O'Leary the next step was putting together a transition team that could do the
job. Anticipating opposition that

ways of effectively

might emanate from

neutralizing this threat

by placing
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DMH headquarters, she sought
central office staff as liaison

on

the key functional areas of the transition team. Acting as chair of the team, she per-

suaded Dan Nakamoto, assistant commissioner for community programs, to serve as
liaison to her.

She then picked the following personnel and gave them

their assignments.

They included Marylou Sudders, clinical concerns and placements; Connie Doto, patient
transfers; Maryellen LaSala and Jeff McCue, labor relations/human resources; Doris
"Chip" Carreiro and Richard Ames, legal affairs; Brian Devin, administrative operations; Lauren Flewelling and Mary McGeown, internal and external communications;
and Peter Callagy, physical plant and property. Their participation proved critical in the
development and execution of the plan.
in a room and explained her
At the end of her explanation, she told them bluntly
they could either accept the challenge or they could leave. She also let them know that
she would be as committed to them as they were to her. This kind of loyalty inspired
motivation. No one left the room. As Doris Carreiro recalled, "Rae's brilliance was in

At

their initial meeting,

O'Leary assembled everyone

ideas about downsizing the hospital.

who could get things done." 81 More basically,
manage and was ready to move.
With O'Leary in charge, the transition team became the symbolic hub of the wheel
that moved the operation forward. The next step was to articulate a set of principles
to guide them in their decision making and other activities. The team defined these prinher capacity to recognize the people

O'Leary wished

to

ciples as follows: (1) the process
priate; (2)

no

client will

move

must be

and

client focused, sensitive

clinically appro-

to a treatment setting clinically less appropriate or in

poorer physical space. In most instances clients will

move

to

improved care

in

improved

space; (3) the process must be open to allow input and assistance from affected individuals, including clients, involved citizens, families, staff, providers, etc.

The commu-

nication system must be ongoing and impeccable; (4) the process must be sensitive

and supportive

to staff

client care during the

whose

positions have

been defunded but who are responsible for

phasedown. Layoffs will occur only as a

last resort.

82

For O'Leary, recouping the $10-million deficiency was the defining problem. Brian
Devin, the operations manager for the Metro West area, soon discovered that they

At first glance, O'Leary worried that this might have
However, she quickly realized that it was due to
the cost of maintaining the Cambridge- Somerville unit, where most of the patients were
hospitalized. The Metro Boston area office wanted to keep this unit open. Since the
were $1 million short of their

been a miscalculation on her

goal.

part.

funds followed the consumers, any cost overruns were ultimately rectified by the central
office.
It

83

should be noted that the

DMH reorganization in

1990 had strengthened O'Leary 's

hand. In her capacity as Metro West area director, she was placed in charge of two

Westborough and Met State. This situation worked to her advantage, because
State patients were eventually transferred to Westborough.
Marylou Sudders was a key actor, a quick study with the capacity to listen and
bring people on board. She managed the daily activities at Met State while O'Leary

hospitals,

most Met
to

supervised the interfacility and interagency details. Both were strong-willed

whose managerial styles
were heavily invested in

differed

the hospital closing.

rigid lines of responsibility

and ready

to

and whose personalities clashed

at times,

O'Leary sought greater

women

but both

control,

more

and authority, whereas Sudders seemed more flexible

meet unforeseen contingencies. Sudders believed

the Cambridge-Somerville area office should

50

that

someone from

have been put on the transition team.
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She saw the issue

as being larger than

should have been involved. She also

Metro West and

felt that

felt that

other area directors

the time lines were too tight and too

abbreviated.

The Resistance Surfaces

No

sooner had the plan been announced than trouble started. The hospital trustees op-

posed the downsizing, which was hardly surprising. Of the

fifteen trustees

who

served

on the board, eight were either mental health recipients or family members. In a
ment distributed to employees on November 27, the trustees declared,
As

a citizen board,

we

recognize that the current

fiscal crisis in

our state requires that

some difficult decisions be made, and we also acknowledge that mere
components to this plan. However, as advocates of the patients at Met
strongly believe that the timetable for implementation

is

state-

are

some

State,

logical

we

extremely unrealistic and

unacceptable. 84

In disseminating this statement, the trustees had set the tone of resistance for the entire
organization.

among

Most employees considered the transition
was following orders from the central office. Others believed that
Met State was being closed as punishment for the sex scandal. Surreptitious obstructionism appeared in the form of an underground newspaper that opposed the phasedown.
Its editors, who were identified as the clinicians at Cambridge Hospital, viciously
attacked Sudders, derisively referring to her as Queen Boney. Some of this criticism
amounted to personal hostility and bitterness. Sudders snuffed out further publication
of this house organ by threatening to report its editors to the medical licensing board.
Anonymous and alarming rumors started circulating. Emotional statements were
made to the effect that the transfer of long-term chronic patients would result in their
death. A review of the literature was launched immediately by O'Leary to determine the
validity of such rumors, but there was little evidence to support them. These obstructionist tactics were described by Alan Greene, a member of the Alliance for the Mentally 111,
Internal squabbles

team a

hit

squad

staff surfaced.

that

as "a rearguard action designed to stop the closing."

Much

85

confusion and consternation prevailed. In the midst of

all

the turmoil, a dan-

gerous patient escaped from the hospital but, fortunately, was captured by the local
police within forty-five minutes and returned to the hospital.

search for a patient on

its

grounds and to notify

state

It

was

DMH policy to

and local police

to look for the

campus boundaries. Once the immediate uproar subsided, Sudders
contacted Dr. Mona Bennett at the central office, who had the patient transferred to
Medfield that same evening.

patient outside the

Implementing the Phasedown
The
its

initial

phasedown began on November

5,

when

the Central Middlesex area closed

admissions. This decision allowed for the shutdown of a receiving ward on

admissions to serve patients

Decem-

would be necessary to maintain
from the Cambridge-Somerville area. The Tri-City area

ber 17, but the administrators soon realized that
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it

made

alternate plans to divert acute admissions to Danvers,

their admissions

382

by January

1.

The census

at

Met

State

which enabled them

to close

on November 30, 1990, was

patients.

O'Leary sensed from the

start that

the trustees might be a problem. She therefore

asked Henry Tomes to meet with them in order to address their concerns and to request

He did so on November 28 and explained to them that it was his deciOn January 29, Tomes met with interested family members at Kline
them essentially the same thing. By so doing, the commissioner took

their assistance.

sion to downsize.

Hall and told

responsibility for the decision and provided a buffer for O'Leary.

At these meetings Tomes
ship and access issues.

He

borough and Worcester and

An

specifically addressed the clinical issues along with hard-

spoke about plans to
to provide a shuttle

install local

telephone lines

at

West-

bus service between the two hospitals.

independent psychiatrist was identified to review individual hardship cases.

A

was identified at each hospital for family questions and concerns. Family
support meetings were scheduled at Met State. A patient transfer packet was developed
and distributed to unit directors and department heads. Arrangements were made for
patients to have their funds and medical records transferred, to have their pictures taken
prior to transfer, and to have luggage purchased for them. These steps were taken at
the end of the third Dukakis administration, when the economic life and social structure
of the state were undergoing wrenching change.
contact person

The Legal Barrier
While Fernando Durand was still in charge, the Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services had filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of Joann Dottin and seven other patients
who were in custody at Met State. The suit charged state officials with failure to release
them and to provide appropriate community services. These patients were ready to be
discharged, but
was unable to place them. Among their lawyers was Steven
Schwartz, who had argued the Northampton case. Counsel contended that their clients
were being held illegally.

DMH

Realizing that this litigation (Dottin

v.

Dukakis) could complicate things and bring

who was general counsel for DMH, set
up a meeting with the plaintiffs' lawyers. At this meeting Doris Carreiro, Rae O'Leary,
and Marylou Sudders presented the transition plan. During these prelitigation negotiations, Ames and Carreiro were able to persuade counsel for the plaintiffs to hold the
case in abeyance. The latter agreed to cooperate if they could exercise some kind of veto
power in the community placement process. This agreement allowed the phasedown to
go forward without further delay.

the

phasedown

to an abrupt halt,

Interestingly enough, both

mony by way

Richard Ames,

Marylou Sudders and Katherine Olberg provided

testi-

Rae O'Leary testified on
behalf of the department because it was in her view the "right thing to do." As it turned
out, the legal issue never came to a head because DMH found community placements
for all but one of the eight patients, who, it was determined, required continued hospital
of an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff, whereas

So she was transferred to Medfield.
Once this major hurdle had been cleared,

care.

the

phasedown proceeded on schedule.

All patient records were carefully reviewed for legal status, guardianship status, and the

need for in-court decree modifications. Judge Kevin Doyle of the Waltham District
Court agreed to hold special court sessions for cases needing review or modification
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prior to transfer. Transfers

were made pursuant

to

law (Chapter 123, section

Few,

3).

if

any, patients contested the transfers.

Met

State staff attempted,

planning for

where

possible, to elicit patient input in the process of

new community programs and

services. Patient ideas concerning transfer

options were also elicited. In addition, patients assisting in planning their discharge
into the

process.

community retained the right to refuse specific placements during the planning
Once patients were discharged, they were systematically tracked by DMH for

ninety days.

The Transfer
The medical

of Patients

director of

Westborough met with Met

on December

A reciprocal

State clinical staff to review clients

meeting was held

at Westborough
weeks
before Governor William Weld was
the following week. On January 2, 1991, two
sworn into office, the initial twenty-five patients were transferred into existing vacancies
at Westborough, where a new ward was established later that month to accommodate an

identified for transfer

7.

additional twenty-five to thirty clients.

Simultaneously, a request for proposal (RFP) was issued for forty-two residential

beds in the Metro West area and eight residential beds
area.

Another sixteen-bed

involved in

site

RFP was

in the

Cambridge-Somerville

issued by the Metro North area. Area staff were

searches with local realtors and

Community Development Corporation

housing partnerships. In addition, a twenty-bed housing program was

Met
in

State campus.

It

was comprised of three homes

that

set up on the
were scheduled for occupancy

January and February of 1991.

Once the phasedown began, the work and commitment of hospital employees allowed for the supportive and orderly transfer of patients. The first few months were the
most difficult, mainly because the institution was still reeling from the sex scandal.
Local telephone lines for towns surrounding Met State were installed at Westborough
and Worcester hospitals, thus facilitating family-to-client and client-to-client communication at no increased expense. A twice-a-week van service was established. Family
support meetings run by Worcester and Westborough staff were begun at Met State and
transferred to the receiving facilities.

In terms of a media strategy, Sudders did not talk with the press unless she
cleared
relied

it

first

with the central office in Boston. She was very protective of the hospital and

on the

clinical leadership to

keep the ranks together. Obviously, there was con-

siderable disruption in the treatment of patients, but they continued to receive their
ications

The

med-

and psychotherapy.

transfer process

was

difficult,

even heart wrenching, with mistakes being made,

plans being changed and modified, and unexpected events being encountered. According

which patients to send to other hospitals and
Kenneth Minkhoff, brought in as a consulting

to Sudders, the toughest decisions involved

which

to send to

community

settings. Dr.

psychiatrist to review difficult placement cases

was

when

the staff could not reach consen-

by Marilyn Berner, a clinical social worker and lawyer. They evaluated
individual situations and made their recommendations accordingly. The purpose of this
sus,

assisted

independent review was to obtain another opinion to help reach consensus rather than to
override an unpopular decision.

Those

new

patients

residential

who were ready

and day programs

for

community placement were accommodated

in their area of origin. Since they originated
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in

from

Metro Boston, Metro West, and the North Shore, these three areas were where the new
Some 311 new residential beds were developed
Danvers, Medfield,
between fiscal years 1991 and 1992. Three other state facilities
residential expansion took place.

and Westborough
institutions

— received

—

patients

who needed

continued inpatient care. These

developed new community programs and quarter-way houses

to

accommo-

date their patients awaiting discharge, which enabled creation of sufficient inpatient

bed space

The

for

Met

transfer to

State transfers.

Danvers presented a special problem. Careful consideration was given

to the fact that patients

was scheduled

were being moved from one closing state hospital
months later. Since the newly built psychiatric

to close six

to

one that

unit at

Tewks-

bury Public Health Hospital was not ready for occupancy, these patients would have

to

be moved twice. This troublesome issue was thoroughly discussed with family members

and the affected

patients,

and only with

Rae O'Leary strenuously objected

their

concurrence would

to this decision.

staffing at Danvers, she felt that the

double

move

this

move

take place.

Given the overcrowding and under-

violated the principle of providing an

equal or better setting.

The Reduction

Force

in

Hospital employees

alarmed

who

received a reduction-in-force notice were understandably

prospect of losing their jobs, their main fear being loss of job security.

at the

In the early stages,

DMH provided

voluntary layoff or those

who

felt

fourteen days' notice to employees opting for a

the impact of the layoffs because they received

no

reassignment or bumping options.

At the

outset, the

maddening. In

employees encountered a cold, impersonal bureaucracy

their eyes,

of their self-worth and their

Some blamed

that

was

DMH exhibited what seemed to them a callous disregard
many

years of loyal service. In short, they felt devalued.

the stupid bureaucracy or Governor Dukakis for their predicament. Others

would never happen or that they could wait out the Weld adminisThey were counting on the legislature to oppose the closing and to protect the
unions. Many adopted the attitude "We won't believe it until they put a padlock on the
door." A lot of people were stuck in denial, buried "knee deep in the big muddy."
While sensitive client care and clinical integrity of the process remained the top
priorities for administrators, appropriate planning for staff ran a close second. During
the phasedown and closing process, significant efforts were made to avoid the necessity
of staff layoffs. To begin with, Rae O'Leary persuaded Henry Tomes to place a hiring
freeze throughout the system and to give first consideration to Met State employees

felt that privatization

tration.

for transfer.

On November 26,

deputy commissioner Stephen

Day

issued a

memo

to all

area directors, which read in part:

Consistent with the

movement of patients from Metropolitan

ically appropriate settings, there is a resulting
facility.

The coordination of

need

to

State Hospital to clin-

lower staffing levels within

this

these staffing reductions with the lowering of the hospital

census poses unique obstacles which can best be addressed by the transfer of affected

employees. While
Hospital,

it is

it

may

not be possible to avoid layoffs totally

the position of the agency that every

avenue

plishing these reductions before proceeding to layoff activities.
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at

Metropolitan State

will be exhausted for

accom-
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which already

Utilizing the transfer language

ing agreements,

all

DMH Areas will

exists with union collective bargain-

be required to provide priority consideration

Metropolitan State Hospital transfer requests. Accordingly, no positions are to be

without

full

requests.

fair

consideration of appropriate Metropolitan State Hospital transfer

86

memo

This

and

started the ball rolling

McCue and

mostly by Jeff

and

motion a

set into

series of events arranged

Maryellen LaSala. Their main objective was to develop a

personnel work plan whereby the least number of employees would be laid
discussed their plan with labor
staff

to
filled

union

officials

and

solicited their

off.

They

feedback regarding

bidding for jobs. 87

Several staff meetings were held for the purpose of answering employee questions.

An

informational booth was set up to advertise employment opportunities and to assist

with resume writing. The Career Counseling Center in the Division of
Training held employee seminars on

of

December

site.

1990, there were fifty-seven requests for transfer on

11,

eight informational postings had been received.

Somewhat

was offered by William Farmer of the

retirement

later,

at least

made

it

file,

daily,

a point to visit

all

forty-

her presence an

rotating

work

shifts

twice each month to talk with staff and to answer their questions. Informal con-

versations and observations were as important as the formal ones. Sudders
to

and

a day-long seminar on

State Retirement Board.

Meanwhile, Marylou Sudders appeared on the wards almost
important factor in calming tensions. She

Employment
As

Hospital job fairs were also scheduled.

was ready

provide information, squelch rumors, listen to complaints, give moral support, soothe

ruffled egos,

and deal with people

what was happening
if it

was

true,

was

in the

who were

community

angry and upset. The

as well as the hospital.

staff

Even

needed

to

know

partial information,

better than none. Bulletin boards, in locked glass cases, provided

the latest information

on the opening of community programs, movement of

clients, cur-

and so on. Printed updates were occasionally distributed with the pay-

rent census data,
roll.

A combination of fiscal carrots

and market forces were employed

the reduction in force. Negotiations regarding a

retirement option were under way. Employees

to implement
bonus incentive program and an early

who

elected voluntary layoff received

lump sum cash payment of $2,268, based on their health insurance costs, an option
that proved attractive to many workers. They were also eligible for unemployment compensation. In the interest of clinical continuity and stability, DMH granted an extended
notice period for voluntary layoffs. An early retirement program soon became available.
The bonus incentive program, however, was not approved. It was turned down by Peter
Nessen, the secretary of administration and finance, who viewed the bonus idea as not
a

cost effective.

On November

14, 1991,

Rae O'Leary

sent commissioner Eileen Elias a status report

that stated,

Our
to

initial

be

optimism
options to

In the end,

commitment

realistic
is

when

to staff to

again increasing.

Met

State

avoid layoffs during the phasedown did not appear

the hospital closure

We

was being confronted. Now, however, our
make every effort to provide employment

intend to

employees who are interested

in such options.

88

most opted for them. The following data summarize employee

from the phasedown through the closing:

55

attrition

Transfers within

DMH

365
22

Transfers to other state agencies

Mothball crew

27

240

Voluntary layoff

Retirements

40

Resignations

38

Laid off (no bumping option awarded)

17

Functional eliminations

27

Discharges

12

Of the 365
were bumped

transfers,

153 staff were transferred laterally with the patients, and 68

into other facilities as a result of the functional eliminations.

voluntary layoffs, 183 were processed after

December

13, 1991,

Of the 240

and 166 employees met

the eligibility criteria for the insurance incentive. All vacation and incentive cashouts

were completed on February 20, 1992. Only 17 employees were laid off. Only one grievance was filed, and that was an affirmative action complaint. When an early retirement
plan was put into effect in July 1992, forty employees took advantage of

From Phasedown
As of June

it.

to Closure

same day that Governor Weld's special commission released its
State was down to 207 clients. For all practical purposes, this
concluded the phasedown. The next day Commissioner Elias, who had just been appointed, visited the hospital to announce to families and staff that it would be closed, a
traumatic moment of truth. Because to this point no one had told them about the closing,
this unenviable duty fell to Elias who broke the news as best she could. She spoke about
the death of an institution and the grieving process that has to accompany it. One partic19, 1991, the

report, the census at

Met

ipant described her visit as a wake.

Movement of patients continued throughout the summer and fall of 1991. As of Nov19, the census was down to 180 patients. By this time 324 employees had left,

ember

and the remainder of patients and workers would leave within the next two months. The
other significant development

bridge Hospital.

was

A contract was

the opening of a

signed on

DMH replacement unit at Cam-

December 16

to

provide seventeen acute-care

beds to accommodate Cambridge and Somerville patients.

As Metropolitan State headed for closure, there was an increase in petty theft as
some wards were closed. This was stopped by moving all furnishings and equipment
from the

When

all

unit

was

and sealing off the closed area immediately
said and done, the final displacement of the

had left.
382 patients was recorded as

after the last patient

follows:

DMH inpatient transfers
DMH community placements

163

156

Admissions diversion

37

DMR community placements

14

Long-term-care placements

5

Other

7

On

January 25, 1992, the

last

staff was moved out and relowards completely empty, Marylou Sudders

group of patients and

cated. Six days later, with the hospital
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invited the trustees and a few special guests to lunch. Afterward she bid

them farewell,

packed her personal belongings, and locked the hospital doors. The previous day, she
had sent a letter to all employees, paying tribute to them for their professionalism and
their caring in a job well done.

Sometime

Commissioner

later,

Elias

met with a group of

mental health professionals. At the end of the meeting, Catherine Dunham,

who had

served under Dukakis, shook hands with Elias and congratulated her by saying, "You

have achieved what
do." 89

It

On

we

was a gracious

tried for so

many

years to accomplish, but

that poignant note, the history of Metropolitan State

crew then put the

we were

unable to

gesture.

facility in mothballs.

came

to

an end. The skeleton

Vacant and boarded up, the hospital currently

resembles a ghost town. Former patients seeking to gain reentry occasionally return.

Over

the past

few years, the three adjoining municipalities, the

state

Division of Capital

Planning and Operations, and the Metropolitan District Commission have reached a

consensus with regard to the disposition of the 346 acres of abandoned property. There
is

something in the reuse proposal for each town: conservation land for Belmont, a

nine-hole municipal golf course for Waltham, and affordable housing for the elderly in

Lexington. The golf course will be designed to have the least impact on the natural envi-

ronment, preserving wetlands and providing for
Hill.

At

this writing, legislation to this effect is

minimum

deforestation of Mackerel

pending before the General Court.

Evaluating Policy Implementation

As may be seen from
setts, different eras

this

sweeping

are defined

by

historical

review of mental health care

different problems.

From

in

Massachu-

the start of the first state

hospital in Worcester in the early 1830s until the Civil War, the

problem was

social con-

War until the New Deal, the problem was
growth and expansion of public asylums. From the New Deal until the New Frontier,
the problem was skyrocketing admissions and warehousing of patients. From the New
trol

and

institutional care.

From

the Civil

was deinstitutionalization and community programs.
The defining issue of today's era is privatization and public managed care.
Once a state assumes responsibility for a public function, it cannot easily discard it.
The policy conundrum of providing institutions of last resort makes disengagement that
much more difficult. The obsession with state hospitals blinded participants to the protection of their own interests and distorted their understanding of the new realities that
Frontier until recently the problem

have emerged in the past several years. Other
Jersey,

have attempted

to close their

states, for

example, Michigan and

New

mental hospitals, but they have not been successful.

In the effort to restructure mental health in Massachusetts, ideology did prevail, and

the workings of the system in a managerial sense improved.

quences of

its

implementation on community

life

Most important,

were anticipated and

the conse-

dealt with re-

sponsibly. What had gone wrong with deinstitutionalization did not go wrong this time.
The major policy achievements closely followed the classical implementation scenario.
Policy goals were stated in such precise terms as "Four mental hospitals to be closed by

1993." Policymakers and implementers
secretary,

DMH, some

—

the governor, the health and

of the mental health lobby

— shared

human

services

these goals, and the entire

Power to control the implementation process was
The implementers were granted the technical authority and

general public supported this policy.
centralized hierarchically.

possessed the technical competence for carrying out the policy goals.
Crisis alone can

empower.

An

early reckoning of the impact of budget reductions
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and

simplified

management showed

was working. The extremely

that the Elias strategy

tight

time constraints permitted those in charge to decide on and implement the closure policy
without prolonged debate. Policy goal attainment required bold leadership and the political will to stay the course.

Previous administrations had faltered and stumbled for lack

of such will. In a major restructuring of this kind, the commissioner
hot seat. Eileen Elias took most of the heat and pressure.

As she

change in a public bureaucracy necessitates determination,

is

says,

on the

definitely

"Managing

tenacity, vision, strategic

and

90
systemic planning, and implementation."

In both reducing spending and consolidating hospitals, the

achieved substantial success. In the

first

Weld

administration

three years, the total savings

were $62

million.

Thirty-four million dollars were used to expand community-based services and $26.7

million to develop replacement units. Furthermore, the

commonwealth avoided

the

expenditure of $43.7 million in capital resources that would have been needed to bring
the closed mental hospitals into compliance with federal certification and accreditation
standards.

a result of

The Department of Mental Health generated $17.9 million in new revenues as
its initiatives and saved $11 million in state employee health insurance costs

for a net state cost savings of

$69

what occurred

million. Unlike

in previous efforts to

deinstitutionalize, this time the resources followed the consumer.

Completing tracking studies of

patients

that they did not slip through the cracks.

1991 to the end of 1992, a

total

who had been

According

discharged helped to assure

DMH tracking data, from July

to

of 963 patients were discharged or transferred from the

to DMH-funded community
274 were placed with their families, nonfamily members, or in independent
living settings, 255 were transferred to another state facility, and 114 were moved to
other treatment facilities. Only two patients were discharged to the street to become
homeless persons. Replacement units for acute care were set up through contracts with
general hospitals, which resulted in a significant drop in the length of stay. State hospitals had longer stays, while general hospitals had much shorter ones. Less than 6 percent
of the state employees who worked in the system were laid off. Most of the others were

three adult hospitals.

Of this number, 312 were discharged

residences,

absorbed elsewhere in the system or hired by private providers.

Much

of the program duplication and overlap that existed within the system was sub-

stantially

However,
The

fiscal and management goals were
Leadholm and Joan Kerzner point out,

reduced so that the
as Barbara

restructuring of the system has not

cesses, there

dations,

come without

were some unavoidable disruptions

and privatization resulted

a price.

substantially realized.

Along with the suc-

in services. Hospital closures, consoli-

in the dislocation of

some

staff as a result

and bumping, and particularly affected vendor-operated community clinics

of layoffs

to

which

DMH clinical staff had historically been assigned. This practice was discontinued in
June 1991 when the Department cashed out the
sequently, a

number of clinical

staff)

state positions.

pectedly, clients of these clinics and their family

and the uncertainties regarding continuity of

The apparent success of the Met

The

clinics (and sub-

were offered contract funds instead. Not unex-

members resented

care.

the disruptions
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State closure is instructive as the

way

to go.

It

provided the textbook school solution to the problem. The entire operation worked

most

to perfection.

From an

executed superbly from

al-

insider's point of view, Doris Carreiro felt that the plan

start to finish.

Scholars have usually applied three criteria to
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They are efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Using
would give the implementers generally high marks for their performance. The transition team led by Rae O'Leary and Marylou Sudders deserves much
evaluate policy implementation.

these criteria,

I

of the credit for planning and implementation.

The

It

elicited trust

and performed well.

efficiency criteria attempt to evaluate quality of performance usually in relation

Here the statistics generated by the Met State closure between fiscal years 1990
and 1994 reveal the following: state funding savings, $28.9 million; inpatient replacement cost, $2.3 million; community expansion cost, $7.1 million; revenue enhancement

to cost.

savings, $0.9 million; group insurance savings, $5 million; and capital cost savings,

$16.7 million. These produced a

total

saving of $42.1 million.

The effectiveness criteria attempt to measure consumer and constituency satisfaction.
After Met State and Danvers had been closed, the Division of Capital and Planning
Operations, the state agency which oversaw the consolidation process, contracted with
the University of Massachusetts to interview clients and families of these two hospitals.

The purpose of the study was to determine whether the state's promise that clients
would have "equal or better" care in their new settings had been fulfilled. A total of

—

were interviewed
59 former Metropolitan State and 27 former Danvers
While most Met State patients had been placed into community group homes
or apartments, most Danvers patients had been transferred to Tewksbury.
No client interviewed rated his or her current placement as "worse" than the prior
86

clients

patients.

hospital placement. In the case of the 59 former

69 percent rated
it

Met

State clients in

community

settings,

their overall posthospital experience as "better" while 31 percent rated

as "equal" to their hospital care. In addition, a majority reported that they felt

involved and satisfied with the transfer process. The 27 Danvers patients were less posi-

new inpatient setting as "better," while 67 percent
Most reported little or no involvement in, and lack of satisfaction
92
with, the process of moving from one facility to another.
Most family members indicated that the client's new placement was "better" than the

tive,

rated

with only 30 percent rating their
as "equal."

it

state hospital in a variety

ty for social activities,

of areas, including living space, facility cleanliness, opportuni-

and privacy. Only a few family members indicated feeling

the closing of the state hospital

nately negative impact

on

where

their relative

that

had received care had a predomi-

member. Many reported not being informed of
would be moved. Many also felt excluded from discharge

their family

the closing or that the client

planning for the hospitalized relative. 93

The equity criteria deal with fairness in delivery of public services. Here the policy
mandate in dispute worked better than most critics were willing to admit. For one thing,
patients

now spend

less

time in a restrictive setting. Formerly, they could spend any-

where from five months to five years at Met State in a deplorable environment. Closing
hospitals was only part of the story. Changes in approaches to care was another important factor, involving looking at mental health from a broader perspective. The problem
lay in seeing clients solely in terms of their acute status
rehabilitation point of view.

sioner

who

understood recovery and rehabilitation. During her tenure she

from constituency groups
for getting patients

turing

and not from a recovery and

DMH needed to capture that model. Elias was a commiswon

praise

for encouraging treatment in the least restrictive settings

more involved

in their

own

care.

On

went a long way toward eliminating the inequities of the two-tier system

prevailed for so

many

years.

No

and

the fairness issue, the restructhat

had

longer were patients discriminated against because they
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were poor or disadvantaged. The practice of "creaming" was eliminated.
The policy jury is still out on the quality and consequences of privatization. Time
whether the quality of services has been enhanced. The most severe critique
was provided by Robert Dorwart and Sherrie Epstein, who see privatization of mental
health care as a fragile balance. They explain,
will tell

This tension between whether

human

obligation or mission to serve

community

service in order to generate a profit

is

services should be supplied because of a public
interests or

one that

we

because of a desire to

sell

believe to be at the heart of

a

many

current policy debates in mental health. Pressures toward increased competition and
cost containment are likely to exacerbate the stress already building as protagonists
94
wrestle with various options for financing and organizing mental health care.

This stress became evident in June 1995
nal report of patient deaths

when

a Department of Mental Health inter-

and suicides was released on an information request. The

data revealed that deaths in the mental health system had risen by 79 percent during the

from 1990 to 1994. When this information reached the public, it
was used by some advocates and the media as evidence to support their position that the
95
public managed-care initiative was detrimental to the seriously mentally ill.
Commissioner Elias, called on to testify and to explain the statistics before the House
Post Audit and Oversight Committee, a legislative watchdog group, explained that in
1992 the criteria for reporting client deaths were expanded to include a broader range of
people having contact with DMH. 96 Even though the increase in the reports of deaths
likely resulted from this expanded method of collecting data, neither the advocates nor
the media accepted this explanation. Instead, they continued to use these data as proof
that the restructuring initiative was linked to increased patient deaths and demanded the
resignation of Commissioner Elias. 97
To deal with the problem and to satisfy the Post Audit Committee's desire to get the
facts from an unbiased source, DMH commissioned an independent team of researchers
to investigate the matter further. More specifically, the researchers were asked to examine the reported increase in patient mortality and whether it was related to the restructuring and public managed-care initiative. The team's report revealed an actual decline
98
in the rate of consumer deaths from 1991 to 1993.
One can argue about the desirability and feasiblity of these policies, but they were
not just rhetorical or ideological talk; they were in the mainstream of mental health policy and program development. The choice between privatization and state hospitals will
continue to require a search for an appropriate balance among competing values where
no final resolution is possible. With the amelioration of one problem, new difficulties
will emerge, compelling public attention. The restructuring will at least permit a costbenefit analysis to be debated in light of the Pacheco law. The important question is
restructuring period

whether the taxpayers are willing to invest sufficient resources to provide for a broad
range of services. Only if the reply is in the affirmative will a comprehensive community support

system become a viable

Whatever the
remain.

Is

duties? Is

possibilities for a

entity.

new range of

the state government shirking
it

relinquishing

its

its

it

few lingering questions
it

evading necessary

oversight function? These are sobering thoughts for policy-

makers
but

services, a

responsibilities? Is

to ponder. In the final analysis, the managed-care concept can be made
depends largely on keeping people out of the hospital.
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work,
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Epilogue

New

After the closure of Metropolitan State, Marylou Sudders became head of the

Hampshire mental health system, which was a career move for her. Meanwhile, the
pressures on Eileen Elias continued to mount. Despite the tendency to oversimplify
events, the media coverage had sparked a public controversy that would not subside. A
few high-profile suicides added fuel to the fire. As a result, the Massachusetts Alliance
for the Mentally 111 continued to beat the drums for Elias's removal. Under fire, Elias
continued to defend her

much maligned

agency.

was appointed by Governor Weld as the new secretary of health and human services. Whitburn came from Wisconsin, where he had been
in charge of public welfare. Elias did not hit it off with her new boss, partly, it was said,
In January 1995 Gerald Whitburn

because Whitburn wanted his

had been asked

that Elias

allowed her

to leave

own

to step

person in the job. So he leaked a story to the press
down. She fought back and won a temporary stay that

on her own terms. Charles Baker saw

burn continued to press for her removal.

On

January

would soon be leaving her post. Three days later,
ders was tapped to replace her as commissioner.
It

may

all

9,

to that.

Nevertheless, Whit-

1996, Elias announced that she

as fate

would have

it,

Marylou Sud-

have been a matter of personality, but Elias's abrasiveness and arrogance

did not help her cause either. She could not be written off as a puppet of the

Weld

ad-

Her forced departure added to the astounding parade of commissioners
who have gone in and out of the revolving door of administrators. From the political
perspective of governors, they are deemed expendable. Yet these exceptional civil servants are the unsung heroes and heroines who are often sacrificed on the altar of cynical
ministration.

politicians.

In November 1995 Governor Weld proposed a reorganization of state government
which the eleven secretariats are reduced to five. Moreover, the sixteen state agencies
that once comprised the Executive Office of Health and Human Services are consolidated into a family services secretariat containing four separate departments. The
Department of Mental Health is slated to be merged into a new Department of Public

in

Health Services. Tinkering with organizational charts and reshuffling agencies

may

help to rationalize the bureaucracy, but the blurring of agency roles and regrouping them

according to function can be viewed as another form of evasion. Ironically, Gerald

who fired Elias, was forced out in June 1996. His ouster reinforced the notion
what goes around comes around.
One final comment. In an age of devolution, when control of health care policies
and expenditures shifts from Washington to the states, pressures to contain costs and
manage the delivery of mental health care will profoundly affect patients and caregivers
alike. Steven Marin, the chief executive officer and chief psychiatrist at McLean Hos-

Whitburn,
that

pital,

warns,

As

third-party payers and

managed-care organizations are increasingly involved

determining where, how, and by
eral

government and the

posing

new

whom

mental health care

state are preparing to

threats to those insured under

the affected will be the

Commonwealth

—

most

who

in

be delivered, the fed-

reduce their spending for such care,

Medicaid and Medicare programs.

socially disadvantaged

precisely those

is to

and severely

ill

Among

patients in the

are least able to protest and/or

draw upon other

sources of support."

The

lives of these vulnerable people haunt the
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ending of

this

system reform

story.
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